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I. Introduction
All nations, regardless of the method they employ, must
maintain their interests in judicial impartiality, judicial
independence, and public confidence in the judiciary in order to
effectuate justice.'
The paramount state objective is public
confidence in the judicial system, and this is achieved when judges
conduct themselves in a manner that appears impartial and
independent.2 Without public confidence in the judiciary, the
public's faith in law erodes and courts become an ineffective
means of dispute settlement. Inappropriate conduct makes the
justice system ineffective, as it tarnishes the judiciary in the
public's eye.3
The manner in which judges are selected contributes to the
erosion of confidence in the judiciary.4 Two methods are typically
employed to select a judiciary: 1) merit selection by a designated
body and 2) judicial election by the public.5 To some, it may
I

See generally J.J. Gass, After White:

Defending and Amending Canons of

Judicial Ethics, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law (Judicial
Independence Series) 5 (2004), http://www.brennancenter.org/resources/ji/ji4.pdf
(advancing that judicial regulation serves three functions: "the right of litigants to
impartial courts; the separation of powers; and public confidence in the courts'
fairness.")
2 Id. at 7.
3 Id. at 14. (citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 565 (1965) ("a State may...
properly protect the judicial process from being misjudged in the minds of the public").
4 See generally J. Clark Kelso, Judicial Elections: Practices and Trends,
INSTITUTE OF LEGISLATIVE PRACTICE (1999),

http://www.mcgeorge.edu/government-

lawandpolicy/publications/ccglp.pubs.judicial-elections-practices.andjtrends-pdf
.PDF (suggesting that judicial elections have garnered skepticism in recent times).
5 Id.at 1.
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appear that merit selection is synonymous with nepotism. 6 Others
may fear that the judicial election process confuses voters by
impermissibly approaching a system akin to politics.7
Moreover, once judges are selected, it is paramount that they
be paragons of justice and virtue.8 It is often necessary to provide
judges with a framework for judicial conduct that furthers the
three interests-to preserve judicial impartiality, judicial
independence, and public confidence in the judiciary through
judicial regulation. 9 As long as the regulations serving as the
framework do not violate that country's constitution, sovereigns
may restrict judicial conduct in any manner they choose. ° Given
that states or nations are free to restrict judicial conduct to the
extent permissible by their respective constitutions, the question is
how loose these explicit and implicit restrictions can actually be,
while still advancing the public's faith in the judicial system?
This Comment advances the argument that only a moderate
degree of judicial independence is necessary to achieve a
maximum amount of public faith in the judiciary. Part II of this
Comment provides a history of the American judiciary, and offers
North Carolina as an example of a judiciary that functions
completely independently from other branches of government.
Part III of this Comment discusses the landmark case Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White 12 and its progeny. In White, the
Supreme Court struck down a Minnesota law prohibiting the
"announcement" of views by both judicial candidates and judges
condemning the prohibition as a violation of the First
Amendment. 13 Many states have used White not only to guide
their analyses of free speech by judges and judicial candidates, but
also-though mistakenly-in their analyses of the appropriateness
6 Id. at 8 (quoting Alexander Hamilton, The FederalistNo. 78, at 495).
7 Id. at 11.
8 See generally JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, STEVEN LUBET, & JAMES J. ALFINI, JUDICIAL
CONDUCT AND ETHICS 2 (3d ed., 2000).

9 See, e.g., ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2004), http://www.abanet
.org/cpr/mcjc/toc.html.
10 See U.S. CONST., art. I § 1 (2004).
11 A corresponding background for the Japanese judiciary can be found at Part VI.

12 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
13 Id. at 788.
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of extra-judicial activities. 14 Moreover, other states have relied on
White to liberalize what judges are allowed to do in most any
setting. 15 Part II1 discusses the progeny of White and their
negative effect on American jurisprudence.
Part IV of this Comment outlines the history and development
of the American Bar Association Model Code (hereinafter "ABA
Model Code") 16 and North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct
(hereinafter "North Carolina Code") 7 as well as The Bangalore
International Principles of Judicial Conduct, 8 which aim to set
international guidelines for judicial conduct. These three sets of
rules are selected for important reasons. North Carolina represents
a liberal set of Canons and is the state that has taken the most
extreme action in liberalizing its Judicial Code post-White. Thus,
the North Carolina Code provides North Carolina citizens with a
judiciary that is extremely independent, completely separate from
the other branches of government, and with very little regulation
of judicial conduct. 9 This framework, however, does not have the
effect of increasing or maintaining the public's confidence in the
judicial system and makes the judiciary an ineffective perpetuator
of justice.
The Bangalore Principles are on the other end of the spectrum
from the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct. The Bangalore
Principles were created with the notion that public confidence in
the judiciary is the ultimate goal of successful regulation. 20 This
idea reinforces the belief that justice can only be served if the
public actually trusts that courts are fair.
The ABA Model Code requires an intermediate amount of
public confidence in the judiciary. It lies somewhere in between
the North Carolina Code and the Bangalore Principles, but it has
14 See, e.g., Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (11 th Cir. 2002); Inquiry Concerning
a Judge (Kinsey), 842 So. 2d 77 (2003); Smith v. Phillips, 2002 WL 1870038 (W.D.
Tex. 2002); Gass, supra note 1, at 2.
15 Gass, supra note 1, at 2.
16 ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2004).
17 NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

(2003).

18 THE BANGALORE INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2004),

http://www.transparency.org/building-coalitions/codes/bangalore_conduct.html.
19 See NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2003).
20 See BANGALORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, at Preamble.
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been liberalized in recent years to allow judges greater
independence in the performance of their judicial duties.
However, the recent changes to the North Carolina Code suggest
that this may not be the right direction for ensuring the greatest
public confidence in the justice system. Thus, achievement of
judicial effectiveness may not be accomplished by placing limits
on judicial conduct. Greater legislative regulation of the judiciary
may be useful, so long as it does not exceed the constitutional
limits of separation of powers. This will be further detailed in Part
VII. Greater legislative regulation may inject the judiciary with
appropriate limits on conduct, leaving the public with a more
favorable view of the justice system.
Part V compares key provisions of the Codes, and measures
how well each set of rules accomplishes the three aims of the
regulation of the judiciary. For example, the American system
operates with a high degree of judicial independence, yet public
confidence remains low. 2 ' Further empirical research is necessary
to precisely quantify whether recent reductions in judicial
restrictions have further reduced public confidence.
Part VI of this analysis focuses on the Japanese judicial
system, which operates in the absence of a judicial code. a2 The
Japanese system has a low degree of judicial independence yet
enjoys a high level of public confidence in the judiciary. 23 The
reasons for this difference are complex and manifold, but mainly
focus on the structure of the Japanese courts themselves. First, a
political body may influence judicial decisions in ways that the
public may not notice.24 Second, Japanese courts routinely refuse
to answer political and quasi-political questions, making their
decisions less controversial than their American counterparts.
21

See

FREQUENCY

GREENBERG

QUINLAN

QUESTIONNAIRE

5

ROSNER

RESEARCH,

INC.,

JUSTICE

AT

STAKE

(2001), http://faircourts.org/files/JASNationalSurvey

Results.pdf [hereinafter JUSTICE AT STAKE].
22 See Interview with Judge James Wynn, Judge, North Carolina Court of Appeals
(June 13, 2004).
23 See John 0. Haley, The JapaneseJudiciary: Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy,

and the Public Trust, 29 (Washington University School of Law, Faculty Working Paper
Series, 2002), http:/Ilaw.wustl.edu/uploadedFiles/Faculty/Haley/TheJapaneseJudiciarySSRN.pdf.
24 The influence of a political body is significant because this does not give the
judiciary complete independence from other branches of the government.
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Third, the rulings of Japanese judges are highly predictable. In
criminal law, for example, Japanese courts have a greater than 99
percent conviction rate. Finally, judges in the Japanese systems
serve their entire careers as judges at various levels and courts
throughout the country, guided by more senior mentors. There are
great discrepancies in the Japanese and American institutional
structures. Much can be gained from discovering exactly how
these differences help Japanese courts garner great public respect.
Part VII of this Comment analyzes what aspects of each type
of system can best achieve public confidence in the judiciary. I
conclude with suggestions based on the analyses offered in other
parts of this comment for improvements in both systems to
promote increases in public confidence.
II. Background
A. The American System
The origin of modem judicial power is found in Article III of
the U.S. Constitution26 and the corresponding articles of state
constitutions. 27 The primary objective of these articles is to secure
fair and just trials for all parties who come before the courts.28
With these objectives in mind, states seek to maintain the
effectiveness of the judicial system through the protection of three
important interests. 29 These interests include: (1) an interest in
judicial impartiality, where impartiality is defined as the "absence
of bias against parties" or "open-mindedness;" 30 (2) an interest in
independence among the three branches of government (akin to
separation of powers); 3 ' and (3) an interest in preserving the
25 See John 0.
Restorative

Justice

Haley, A
in

Spiral of Success: Community Support is Key to

Japan,

THE

ECOLOGY

OF

JUSTICE

32

(1994),

http://www.context.org/ICLIB/IC38/Haley.htm.
26 U.S. CONST. art. III.

27 See, e.g., C.A. CONST. art. VI (2004); N.C. CONST. art. VI (2004); P.A. CONST.
art. V (2004).
28 Gass, supra note 1, at 5.
29 Id.

30 Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 778 (2002); see also
Gass, supra note 1, at 6 (discussing principles of Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White).
31 Gass, supra note 1, at 8.
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public's confidence in the judiciary through maintenance of the
appearance of judicial impartiality and independence among the
three branches of government. 2 Judicial restrictions designed to
meet these goals are subject to a strict scrutiny constitutional
analysis.33
The method of judicial selection used to establish a judiciary
that conforms to the three state interests has been the subject of
much dispute.34 At the founding of the United States of America,
state officials believed that the best way to preserve their interests
was to appoint judges for life, like the federal system, reasoning
that the absence of external influences would ultimately protect
the appearance and reality of judicial independence and
impartiality.35 However, appointment was often accompanied by
political favoritism, which eventually dispelled the public's
satisfaction with the judicial branch.36
Furthermore, Marbury v. Madison's standard of judicial
review 37 gradually became the predominant view, accompanied by
the view that grave danger lay in appointing judges for life,
because life tenure made judges unaccountable to the public.38
Jacksonian Democrats initiated a movement in the early 1800's to
limit life tenure through the democratization of judicial
appointment using popular elections.3 9 The climax of this debate
occurred in 1846, when the state of New York abandoned its
system of gubernatorial appointment in favor of popular
elections. 41 Soon, many states followed suit.4' Today, thirty-nine
32 Id. at 5, 9; see also ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2004), at Canon

2.
33 Gass, supra note 1, at 5. A strict scrutiny constitutional analysis consists of a
narrowly tailored means to achieve a compelling state interest.
34 Kelso, supra note 4, at 7, 9. Also note that I am not referring to federal judges in
this analysis, because they are granted life tenure under Article III of the U.S.
Constitution. I am referring to state judges and the state's interests in these judges.
35 Id. at 8 (citing Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 79, at 497, "[n]ext to
permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges
than a fixed provision for their support ... .
36 Id. at 10.
37 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
38 Kelso, supra note 4, at 10.
39 Id.
40 Id.
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states continue to hold judicial elections of some form, either
partisan or nonpartisan."
The establishment of popular elections brought with it other
controversies, however, as judicial elections quickly turned into
partisan combat in which judges and judicial candidates catered to
political interests in order to win or keep judicial seats.43 The
public soon lost confidence in the impartiality and independence
of the judiciary, as it witnessed judges indulge in the "political
machinery" of the late 1800s. 44 Such conduct led to a judicial
crisis in which judges became indistinguishable from politicians.45
In a 1906 address to the American Bar Association, Harvard Law
School Dean Roscoe Pound identified this crisis as one that could
"... almost destroy the traditional respect for the bench. 46
Some claimed that the "political machinery" of judicial
campaigns could be counteracted by holding nonpartisan elections
as set forth by legislatures in state statutes.47
The phrase
''nonpartisan elections" refers to a judicial ballot devoid of party
affiliations.48 In theory, nonpartisan elections prevent uninformed
voters from voting for a straight party ticket.49 Straight ticket
voting is undesirable, because voters should be indifferent to the
personal ideologies of any given judicial candidate.5" Once on the
Id. (although Article III of the Constitution gives exclusive power for the
appointment of federal judges).
42 Id. at 11; see also American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the States:
Appellate and General Jurisdiction Courts (Apr. 2002), http://www.ajs.org/js/
JudicialSelectionCharts.pdf at 3 (listing the initial selection methods implemented by the
states).
43 Kelso, supra note 4, at 11.
41

44 Id. at 12. (for example, the Tammany Hall organization, notorious for exerting
extreme political influence on the New York judiciary).
45 See id.
46 Id. (quoting Dean Roscoe Pound, Address to the American Bar Association, The
Causes of PopularDissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, reprintedin 46 J.
Amer. Judicature Soc. 55 (1962)).
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 A voter's party affiliation is the single best predictor of the candidate that that
voter chooses in a judicial election. See SHAMAN, supra note 8, at 20.
50 Gass, supra note 1, at 13 (quoting the majority's opinion in Ackerson v. Ky. Jud.
Retirement and Removal Comm'n, 776 F.Supp. 309, 315 (W.D. Ky. 1991) (promises by
judicial candidates "impair the integrity of the court by making the candidate appear to
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bench, personal views should not enter into a judge's application
of the law, as state judges are bound by the laws created by the
legislature and the legal interpretations imposed by the highest
courts of their states. 5'
However, there are two difficulties with nonpartisan elections.
First, partisanship readily enters into nonpartisan campaigns. 2 For
example, political parties may endorse certain candidates, turning
de jure nonpartisan campaigns into de facto partisan ones.53 Some
General Assemblies have enacted laws to counteract the
occurrence of de facto partisanship only to have the
constitutionality of such statutes challenged as a violation of the
free speech rights of political parties.54 Most de facto partisanship
occurs because political endorsements of candidates cannot be
prohibited by the legislature in the form of state statutes or codes.55
Second, truly nonpartisan campaigns provide little or no
information to the voters who must elect judicial officials, which
ultimately frustrates voters because they ultimately feel
uninformed about judicial candidates.56
B. The North CarolinaSystem
Like the rest of the country, North Carolina originally
appointed all state judges for life.57 In 1868, the legislature
enacted a statute establishing partisan judicial elections, which
limited terms to eight years.58 Over the last ten years, the General
Assembly moved for nonpartisan elections, beginning with
superior and district court judges. In 2004, elections for the North
have pre-judged an issue without benefit of argument or counsel, applicable law, and the
particular facts presented in each case").
51 See id.
52

Kelso, supra note 4, at 18.

53 See id.
54 See, e.g., Kelso, supra note 4, at 22-23. California voters supported Proposition
49, which banned political party endorsements of judicial candidates in nonpartisan
elections; Proposition 49 was later held unconstitutional as unduly burdening the free
speech rights of political parties and organizations.

55
56

Id. at 18.
Id. at 17.

57 See American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the States: North
Carolina, http://www.ajs.org/js/NC.htm.
58

See id.
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Carolina Court of Appeals and North Carolina Supreme Court
were nonpartisan elections." Yet, despite legislation that provides
for the nonpartisan nature of elections, de facto partisanship still
occurs in North Carolina, as it does in other states.6" For instance,
candidates may be endorsed by a political party6 and candidates
themselves may attend or even speak at meetings of political
organizations.62
III. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White
In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,6 3 the Supreme
Court struck down as a violation of the First Amendment' the
Minnesota "Announce" clause, which stated that a "candidate for a
judicial office, including an incumbent judge," shall not
"announce his or her views on disputed legal or political issues."65
The majority reasoned that campaign speech is a form of election
or political speech, exactly the type of speech that the First
Amendment was originally intended to protect.66 Under a strict
scrutiny analytic standard, the court found the "Announce" clause
failed this test.67
In order to meet strict scrutiny review, there must be a
compelling interest and a narrowly tailored means of
accomplishing the compelling interest. 68 In White, the Court said
that preserving the impartiality of the judiciary is a compelling
interest for any state,69 where "impartiality" is defined as a "lack
59 Judicial Campaign Reform Act of 2002, ch. 163, 2002 N.C. Sess. Laws 158;
American Judicature Society, supra note 56.
60 Gass, supra note 1, at 4; Kelso, supra note 4, at 12-13.

61 Kelso, supra note 4, at 22-23.
62 NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2003) at Canon 7(B)(1).
63 536 U.S. 765 (2000).
64 The decision was a vote of 5-4.
65 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 52, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i)
(2000).
66 White, 536 U.S. at 774.
67 Id. at 776.

68 Id. at 774-75.
69 Id. at 775-80. (The Court did not address independence of the judiciary as a
compelling state interest. The reason was that the appellants wrote their brief in such a
manner that judicial impartiality and judicial independence were one and the same. The
Court similarly did not consider an interest in public confidence in the judiciary).
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of bias for or against either party to the proceeding ' 71 or "openmindedness."'
The Supreme Court independently volunteered
these definitions, as "impartiality" remained undefined in the
Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct, as well as the ABA Model
Code at that time.72
In using these definitions of "impartiality," the majority
simultaneously rejected the alternate and traditional definition of
"impartiality" as a compelling state interest 3 because, due to
human nature, preconceptions in regard to issues are inevitable,
even for judges.74 Thus, even at this initial stage of analysis, the
Court suggests that judicial candidates who announce their views
about a particular issue will remain impartial whereas judicial
candidates who announce their views about particular litigants or
classes of litigants will not be impartial.75 The Court's definition
of "impartiality" presumably applies to every case that comes
before any court, regardless of the fact that the majority
emphasized that their analysis pertained only to the "Announce"
clause.
Despite finding a state's compelling interest in judicial
impartiality, the majority concluded that Minnesota's "Announce"
clause was not narrowly tailored to advance the interest in judicial
impartiality, even given the two definitions of impartiality that the
Court espoused.76 The Court held that the language of the
"Announce" clause was overly broad because it covered judicial
speech that fell within the permissible realm, prohibiting speech
aimed at disputed legal issues but not on particular classes of
parties.77 The clause was simultaneously underinclusive as it only
prohibited announcement of views but failed to prohibit outright

70 Id. at 775.
71 Id. at 778.

72 See Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. at 775.
73 Id. at 777; e.g., "lack of preconception in favor of or against a particular legal
view."
778.
75 Id. at 776. (Often announcing views about a particular issue is comparable to
announcing views about a particular group of persons).
76 See White, 536 U.S. at 777 (n. 7).
74 Id. at

77 Id. at 776.
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commitment to a certain viewpoint.78 This analysis appealed to
the majority because judges were free to admit their closemindedness on disputed issues in other fora.7 9
Justice O'Connor's concurrence noted that the "very practice
of electing judges"80 compromises the "State's compelling
governmental interes[t] in an actual and perceived . . . impartial

judiciary."'" Accordingly, though judges are supposed to remain
impartial, they are held accountable to the public through judicial
elections, and must make decisions that conform to what the
public wants. Otherwise, their chances of re-election are bleak.82
Judges, owing to their human nature, cannot "suppress their
awareness of the potential electoral consequences of their
decisions and refrain from acting on it."83 Thus, Justice O'Connor
attributed any residual impartiality to the particular judicial
selection method rather than to any trespass outside the bounds of
appropriate judicial campaign speech.84 Justice O'Connor's
concurrence is important because subsequent cases on judicial
misconduct interpret White in a similar manner. That is, they
interpret White to say that if judges are going to be elected, then
few restrictions should be placed on the election process, even
though this was not in the majority opinion.
Justice Kennedy's separate concurrence made the point that
"content-based
speech"
should receive
strict scrutiny
constitutional protection, unless it falls under one of the clearly
designated First Amendment exceptions,85 which was not the case
in White. Kennedy relied on the premises that "the political
speech of candidates is at the heart of the First Amendment," and
that "direct restrictions on the content of candidate speech are
78 Id.

at 780.

79 Id. at 779.

80 Id. at 788 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
81 Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. at 788 (citing Brief for
Respondents at 8, White, 536 U.S. 756 (No. 01-521)) (O'Connor also suggested that the
Court recognized that public confidence in the judicial system was a compelling state
interest by referencing a "perceived impartial judiciary").
82 Id. at 789.

83 Id.
84 Id. at 792.
85 Id. at 793 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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simply beyond the power of the government to impose."86
According to Kennedy, any code of judicial conduct can restrict
the activities of judges but only insofar as it falls short of
restricting speech during a judicial campaign.87 Some states infer
that Kennedy's opinion represents the views of the majority.
However, this is a misuse of Kennedy's concurrence, because his
views did not have the support of the majority.
The Court issued two dissents, written by Justice Stevens and
Justice Ginsburg, with the other three dissenters joining each
opinion.88 Justice Stevens' dissent espoused the idea that, by
lifting restrictions previously placed on speech during judicial
elections, the majority confounded judicial elections with political
elections.89 Stevens believed the two types of elections ultimately
should be kept distinct because they have different purposes. 90 By
removing restrictions on campaign speech, the Court, in essence,
politicized judicial campaigns, making judges the equivalent of
politicians. In fact, he argued that States do have a compelling
interest in impartiality, as recognized by the majority, and that the
"Announce" clause, as set forth, is narrowly tailored to achieve
impartiality because the announcement of views by judicial
candidates suggests nothing short of a bribe to win election into
office. 9'

Announcement of views is doubly offensive, then,

because it not only serves as a bribe, but also has the ability to
erode the public's confidence in the judiciary.92 Rather than
increase the public's confidence in the judiciary, Stevens asserted
that the majority's opinion was counterproductive because it
encourages the perception that the standards for judicial elections
parallel
the standards for political elections, which is not the
93
case.

86

White, 536 U.S. at 793.

87

Id. at 794.

88

See id. at 796, 803.

89

Id. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

90 See id.
91 Id. at

800.

This is a compelling state interest, which the majority fails to recognize in its
argument. Instead, the majority focused solely on actual impartiality as a compelling
state interest. See White, 536 U.S. at 802.
93 Id. at 803.
92
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In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued that the "ability of the
judiciary to discharge its unique role rests to a large degree on the
manner in which judges are selected."94 According to her, the
majority believed that "an election is an election," and if judicial
seats are to be filled by election, then candidates should be entitled
to a complete election, including accompanying freedom of speech
guarantees.95 However, in the dissent's view, a judicial election is
not an election in the traditional sense because, by definition in our
federal Constitution,
judges must inherently refrain from being
"political actors., 9 6 Ginsburg contended that a judicial candidate
could avoid violating the "Announce" clause by using the words,
"although I cannot promise anything . .

.

" to preface any

statements made in regard to issues likely to come before the
court. 97 Because the dissent believed that the language of the
"Announce" clause was narrowly tailored to achieve the state's
compelling interest in judicial impartiality, it espoused the notion
that the Court failed to distinguish political elections from judicial
ones.
A. Cases ChallengingRestrictionson Judicial Campaign
ConductAfter White
In the time since the Supreme Court handed down its decision
in White, a myriad of other cases have been brought forth
challenging the constitutionality of Canons restricting judicial
conduct during campaigns, as well as the restrictions placed on
judicial conduct in general.98 These cases originate from a diverse
range of states, though the state-level courts' reasoning and
outcomes have relied, at least in part, on their interpretations of the
White decision. 99 Taken together, these cases suggest a movement
toward lessening restrictions on our judiciary. This raises the
questions: when fewer restrictions are placed on judicial conduct,
94
95
96
97
98

Id. at 804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 805.
Id. at 806.
Id. at 819.
See Gass, supra note 1, at 2-4.

99 Id. at 4 (pointing to the North Carolina Supreme Court's order from April 2,
2003 as an example of how White has been used to implement "unnecessarily broad
[Code] revisions" that have the effect of liberalizing how judges are permitted to act).
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how strong a third branch of government can we possibly have?
And, in light of the lessening of restrictions, can the third of the
state interests-an interest in public confidence in the judiciaryremain protected?
The majority in White espoused the view that if states choose
to engage in judicial elections, then First Amendment rights
cannot be restricted through clauses prohibiting "announcement"
of certain views.' °° But other courts have interpreted White more
broadly, thereby granting judicial candidates' campaign rights that
approximate those of political candidates. A Texas district court
relying on White held unconstitutional a Canon prohibiting judicial
candidates from "mak[ing] statements that indicate an opinion on
any issue that may be subject to judicial interpretation ... except
that discussion of an individual's judicial philosophy is
appropriate if conducted in a manner which does not suggest to a
reasonable person a probable decision on any particular case." '
Chief District Judge Nowlin found this clause indistinguishable
from the "Announce" clause that was the subject of White.102
However, in Smith, the court's reasoning is unclear. The court
could have come to its conclusion for one of two different, albeit
both faulty, reasons. First, the court could have interpreted
"indicate an opinion"' 10 3 to mean "announc[e] a view," which
would fail in the White interpretation because the "indicate an
opinion" clause, like the "Announce" clause, would be classified
as underinclusive. 104
Nevertheless, this interpretation is
problematic. "[I]ndicate an opinion" is a stronger statement of
belief than mere "announc[ement]." According to the regulation
at issue in Smith, discussion of legal views is acceptable if a
reasonable person would not construe it as a commitment to

100 See generally White, 536 U.S. 765. Although it is possible that the majority
opinion also meant to imply that prohibiting "announcement" against certain parties was
tolerable. It is questionable whether the White opinion only applies to judicial elections,
and not judicial appointment.
101 Smith v. Phillips, No. CIV.A.A-02CVl1lJRN, 2002 WL 1870038 (W.D. Tex.
Aug. 6, 2002) (order declaring Canon 5(1) of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct to be
unconstitutional) (emphasis added).
102 Id.
103 Id. (citing TEX. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5(1)).
104 Id.
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decide a certain way in a future case.' °5 Such an interpretation
suggests that in order to violate this regulation, a judicial candidate
would have to do much more than simply announce his views.
Thus, loosening the standards for judicial conduct in this
manner permits judicial candidates in the state of Texas to do
more than announce beliefs, as long as what they say falls short of
actually committing to how they would rule in a case pertaining to
those beliefs. However, exactly how short Smith falls is uncertain.
Based on the implication in White that prohibiting announcement
may be tolerable in certain instances (i.e., when it occurs against
0 6
parties) an a priori ban on all announcement is premature.1
Thus, the Smith Court's reading of White is overly broad because
it is inconsistent with the idea that some types of announcement
may be prohibited-including that which may occur on "any
particular case"° 7-and some types may be permissible, as the
Supreme Court's majority opinion in White suggests.
Second, the Smith court could have reached its decision by
finding the "reasonable person" standard-akin to the "appearance
of impropriety"-to be unnecessarily vague, preventing judicial
candidates from receiving sufficient notice about what actually
constitutes improper conduct. The White court only mentioned
vagueness in regard to the "Announce" clause as including
conduct that was appropriate, such as announcing views against
issues, and in this regard was overinclusive. It did not use
vagueness in regard to any "appearance of impropriety."'0 8
Therefore, although the second reason is plausible analytically, it
is inconsistent with the reasons set forth in White as to why the
"Announce" clause was ultimately found unconstitutional.
Accordingly, the Smith court must have interpreted the majority's
opinion in White to hold unconstitutional most, if not all,
restrictions on judicial campaign speech and conduct.
It is true that the Smith court was willing to permit judicial
105 See generally id. (implying that "indicate an opinion" is weaker than
"commitment" to a certain view).
106 Gass, supra note 1, at 11.
107 If the type of bias that occurs in any particular case regards bias against
particular parties, not issues.
108 See generally White, 536 U.S. 765 (failing to mention vagueness in the Court's
analysis).
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speech that amounted to more than mere announcement of views.
However no court has been willing to find invalid under the First
Amendment the "Commit" clause or the "Pledge and Promise"
clause,'0 9 both clauses that prohibit substantially more than
announcement." 0 At least thirty-seven states have included some
form of both of these clauses."i ' The fact that so many states
refuse to compromise these clauses suggests that it is
constitutionally permissible, as well as socially desirable, to
restrict at least some forms of campaign speech for judicial
candidates so that an independent and impartial judiciary is best
achieved.
Courts have been willing to interpret White broadly to mean
that campaign speech, including language containing falsehoods
directed at opponents, is central to judicial elections and must be
absolutely protected. In the 2002 Weaver v. Bonner decision, the
Eleventh Circuit" 12 struck down a clause that pertained to the
prohibition of negligent falsehoods, protecting the right of judicial
candidates to make false statements. 13 This Court reasoned that
prohibitions of statements known to be false or made with reckless
disregard for the truth are narrowly tailored to meet the compelling
state interest of judicial impartiality." 4 Negligent statements, on
the other hand, are inconsistent with narrow tailoring, because
negligent statements are within the "breathing space" allotted to
freedom of expression during political campaigns." 5 Thus, this
decision created an "actual malice" standard that applied to the
espousal of falsehoods directed at judicial opponents in the
Eleventh Circuit." 6 This sudden change is noteworthy because
forty-six states have adopted the lower standard of the 1990 ABA
109 Although it will be subsequently noted that the North Carolina Supreme Court,
by its own will, removed the "Pledges and Promises" clause from the North Carolina
Code of Judicial Conduct in 2003.
110 North Carolina and Georgia have removed the prohibition against making
"pledges and promises" from their Codes. Gass, supra note 1, at 11.
"'I

Id.

112 Representing the states of Alabama, Georgia, and Florida.
113 309 F.3d 1312, 1319-20 (11 th Cir. 2002).
114 Id. at 1319.
115 Id. (discussing Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60-61 (1982)).
116 Id.
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Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires only knowledge,
or the "reckless disregard" for knowledge." 7 The fact that so
many states continue to maintain an interest in prohibiting
negligent falsehoods during judicial campaigns indicates that
states seek to protect and preserve their interests in public
confidence in the judiciary.
On the other hand, the "actual malice" standard as utilized in
the Eleventh Circuit is self-defeating because proving "actual
malice" is a difficult task.118 However, the use of the "actual
malice" standard may be effective in certain instances. The
Florida Supreme Court in a subsequent case appears to use the
"actual malice" standard in imposing sanctions against a judicial
candidate whose statements
were literally true as spoken, but were
120
meant" 9 to mislead.

In Weaver, the Eleventh Circuit upheld simultaneously the
constitutionality of the "Commit" clause and the "Pledges and
Promises" clause as found in Georgia's Code of Judicial Conduct.
Only later was Georgia's "Pledges and Promises" clause removed,
on the Georgia Supreme Court's own motion. 121 It may be argued
that state supreme courts, acting under their own will in removing
restrictions on judicial conduct, especially those found to be
constitutional by even higher courts offend the public's confidence
in the judiciary by this very act.
Astoundingly, Weaver had the effect of removing still other
judicial constraints. 22 The Eleventh Circuit also struck down a
clause prohibiting personal solicitation of campaign funds by
judicial candidates. 23 This clause was previously included in
Georgia's Code because permitting judicial candidates to
personally solicit money results in the appearance of impropriety
117

Gass, supra note 1, at 16.

See, e.g., First Amendment Limitations on Civil Law Liability, Exploring
Constitutional
Conflicts,
http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw
/commonlaw.htm (explaining the requirements for "actual malice").
119 This is the key to proving "actual malice."
118

120

In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 90 (2003).

121 See Order Amending Ga. Code of Judicial Conduct (Jan. 7, 2004, Supreme Court
of the State of Georgia), http://www2.state.ga.us/courts/supreme/jqc-%207 27_or.html.
122 Weaver v, Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1322-23 (11 th Cir. 2002).
123 Id.
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if not actual impropriety itself. If candidates target certain people
for money or show appreciation for their fundraising sources, then
the public may believe that the judge, once on the bench, will look
with greater favor upon campaign contributors.124 Moreover, the
public may feel obligated to contribute to a campaign where a
judge asks for funds because of the status associated with his
position. 125 Where prohibitions of judicial solicitation still exist,
(i.e., in Maine), courts are likely to put a greater emphasis on the
illegality of any solicitation of money that supports candidacy or a
campaign, regardless of whether solicited
funds are directly
26
deposited in the candidate's account. 1
Contributing to the problem of successful maintenance of the
third state interest,127 there has been a rising movement for courts
to interpret their state's Canons as being overly vague, (i.e., failing
to give adequate notice to judicial candidates or to judges), as to
what constitutes misconduct or improper behavior. 21 8 As a result,
courts have been increasingly willing to strike out the "appearance
of impropriety" or "reasonableness" language in the Codes. For
example in Griffen v. Arkansas JudicialDiscipline,129 an AfricanAmerican judge appeared before the legislature to represent his
interest in collegiate diversity. The Arkansas Appellate Court
determined that the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon
4C(l) was vague. The majority so held because they did not think
Canon 4C(1), which prohibits judges from "acting pro se in a
matter involving the judge or the judge's interest," specifically
defined what the term "pro se" actually included. 3 ° Indeed, the
court argued that, based on the Canon's language alone, there was
no way that Judge Griffen would be on notice that his speech in
front of the Arkansas legislature was impermissible. 3 It is no
surprise that there is a growing trend in judicial conduct
124 Gass, supra note 1, at 17.
125 SHAMAN, supra note 8, at 295.

126 See In re Dunleavy, 838 A.2d 338 (Me. 2003).
127 I.e., maintenance of the public's confidence in the judiciary.
128 See, e.g., Griffen v. Arkansas Judicial Discipline, 130 S.W.3d 524 (Ark. 2003)
(finding the term "pro se" vague).
129 Id.

130 I.e., the term "pro se" was overly broad. Id. at 525.
131 Id.
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proceedings for courts to sympathize with judges who appear
impartial, though they may not have actually been impartial.
These courts strike down challenged regulations as vague for
failing to provide adequate notice about prohibited behavior. 132
IV. Codes of Judicial Conduct
A. HistoricalDevelopment of the ABA Model Code of
JudicialConduct
In 1924, the American Bar Association (hereinafter "ABA")
began regulating judicial conduct through the creation of canons
which outlined what judges should and should not do. However,
these canons were permissive in nature.133 This means that if a
violation occurred, then no remedy existed to correct the
violation.134
The 1924 Canons were developed merely to
discourage judges from pursuing extrajudicial activities that
appeared to conflict with their judicial duties.1 35 For example,
Kennesaw Mountain Landis, a federal court judge, was elected the
first Commissioner of Baseball in 1920, but he refused to resign
his judicial position to pursue his extracurricular duties, even
136
though they sometimes conflicted with his judicial duties.
Because no guidelines existed for judicial behavior at this time,
Landis was not penalized.
In 1972, the Canons were replaced by an all-encompassing
ABA Code-replete with Canons which could be enforced-that
imposed penalties for rule violations.137 The Canons were
subsequently revised in 1990, 1997, and 2003.138 The current
edition is 2004.139 Proposed drafts to the 2004 code are now the

132 Note that there will be a subsequent discussion of vagueness and the "appearance
of impropriety." See infra p. 134.
133 See ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2004).
134 See generally id.
135 Id.
136 Id.

137 See generally ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972).
138 See generally ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1990); ABA MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1997); ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2003).

139 See generally ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2004).
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focus of committee meetings and public hearings. 140 The ABA
Model Code was created because the drafters have always retained
an interest in public confidence in the judiciary; 14 1 however,
proposed modifications have permitted expanded judicial conduct
which may ultimately serve to frustrate this goal.
B. HistoricalDevelopments of the North CarolinaCode of
Judicial Conduct
The North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct was selected for
analysis in this Comment because recent revisions have reduced
the amount of judicial restrictions in place. This analysis will
examine whether judicial effectiveness and public confidence can
be achieved in light of such revisions.
The General Assembly delegated its legislative powers to the
North Carolina Supreme Court to provide the standards for
judicial conduct. 4 2 This is largely inconsistent with the method
used in other states. 4 3 This Comment uses North Carolina as an
example because, despite the growing trend of loosening
restrictions on judicial conduct, no state has taken as extreme an
action as the state of North Carolina.'" Rather than interpret their
Code in light of constitutional challenges as they are brought forth
against the Code, the Supreme Court took cautionary measures by
completely revamping the Code by its own will in April of
2003.' The Supreme Court sought no external direction 146 -there
were no public hearings, committees formed, or any sort of public
knowledge, constructive or actual, that code revisions were taking
place within the walls of the North Carolina Supreme Court.'47

140 See American Bar Association, About the Commission, http://www.abanet.org
/judicialethics/about.html.
141 ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2004), Preamble.
142

N.C.

GEN. STAT.,

§ 7A-10.1 (2003).

E.g., Arizona and other states create a commission that looks at the ABA Model
Code and makes revisions to it, according to the needs of their states. See Arizona
Judicial Conduct and Ethics, THE BULLETIN, No. 4, (Commission on Judicial Conduct &
Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee) Oct. 1993, at 1.
144 Gass, supra note 1, at 4.
143

145
146

Id.
Id.

147 Id.
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The North Carolina Supreme Court has the power to rewrite
the Code. The General Assembly delegated its legislative duties
to the Supreme Court for the sole purpose of creation and
maintenance of a Judicial Code of Conduct. 148 If the General
Assembly so desired, it could have set forth by statute its own set
of rules for judicial conduct, such as the specification of the
amount of experience required, age requirements, time on the bar,
and improper conduct. 149 This would not violate separation of
powers as proscribed by the North Carolina Constitution. 5 0
Alternatively, the General Assembly could have adopted the ABA
Model Code as North Carolina's Code of Judicial Conduct, but
expressly chose not to by delegating their lawmaking powers to
the North Carolina Supreme Court.''
C. The Bangalore InternationalPrinciplesof Judicial
Conduct
The Bangalore International Code of Judicial Conduct was part
of a United Nations (hereinafter "UN") movement to strengthen
the judicial systems at the international level. 152 The Bangalore
Principles were selected for analysis in this Comment because the
drafters explicitly value continued public confidence in the
judiciary as a means of achieving judicial effectiveness. The
Bangalore Principles were promulgated after a series of meetings
of the Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity.'5 3
Members of this group included representatives from Bangladesh,
India, Nepal, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and
Australia."' The Code was accepted in November of 2002 after a
thorough review of several existing codes including, but not
limited to: the 1972 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, the
European Charter on the Statute for Judges, the Code of Judicial
148 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-10.1
149

(2003).

N.C. CONST. arts. II and IV (2005).

150 Id.
151 Id.
152 See BANGALORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, at Explanatory Note 1: Judges
Welcome UN Endorsement of Judicial Code of Conduct, Transparency International,
http://www.transparency.org/pressreleases-archive/2003/2003.04.25.bangalore-code.htm.
153 See BANGALORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, at Explanatory Note 1.

154 Id. at Explanatory Note 3.
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Conduct of the Philippines, and the Beijing Statement of
Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the Lawasia
Region. 55
V. Regulation of Judicial Conduct
This Part of the Comment addresses several important aspects
of the rules that differ among the Codes. These include: integrity,
independence, impartiality, and prohibitions against appearances
of impropriety, ex parte communications, disqualification of
judges and reasonableness, financial interests, extracurricular
activities, extra-judicial duties, compensation for extra-judicial
duties, and political conduct. Through this analysis, I discuss how
well each set of rules addresses these topics. More specifically, I
address how much judicial independence each Code or set of rules
affords judges. In doing so, I comment on whether the selected
provisions will ultimately provide the public with an effective
judiciary. I then address which type of Code best achieves the
state's interests in the judiciary, with a focus on which code best
maintains public confidence in the judicial system.
A. Integrity, Independence, Impartiality, and Prohibitions
Against Appearances of Impropriety
Both the current ABA Model Code 5 6 and the proposed
revision to the ABA Model Code15 suggest that a judge should
maintain "high standards of conduct" as guided by the Canons in
order to preserve the "integrity and independen[ce].

. .

of the

judiciary."' 5 8 However, the revised Code not only stresses the
preservation of the "integrity .

. .

and independence of the

judiciary,"'5 9

as the old Code does, but it also expressly
emphasizes 160 the importance of the rules in promotion of "public
confidence" in the judiciary. 161 The ABA framers make the
155 Id. at Explanatory Note 2.
156 ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 1 (2004).
157 REVISED DRAFT ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Preamble (2005)

http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/preliminaryreport.html.
158 See ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 1(a) (2004).
159 REVISED DRAFT ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT,

160 In the actual Canon rather than in its commentary. Id.
161 Id. at 1.02.

Canon 1 (2005).
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avoidance of impropriety and its appearance an overarching
principle of judicial conduct embodied in this Canon.162 The ABA
framers stress that the appearance of impartiality is important
because "a' 63judge must expect to be the subject of constant public
scrutiny."'
The ABA draft Model Code retains language discouraging
"the appearance of impropriety."" By retaining this clause, the
drafters of the Model Code made explicit that the public's
confidence in the judiciary is an important state interest, rather
than ignoring it altogether. The goal of a policy that prohibits the
"appearance of impartiality" is to discourage judges from acting or
appearing to act in manners "inconsistent" with an impartial
judiciary. 165 In order for court orders to be given due effect, the
public must perceive the judiciary as upright, just, and not unduly
influenced by external factors. If the public fails to perceive the
judiciary 66as such, then the judicial system will not function
properly. 1
The ABA Model Code explains that the "appearance of
impropriety" occurs "when the conduct could create in reasonable
minds a perception that the judge's ability to carry out judicial
responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and competence is
impaired."'' 67 Moreover, an "appearance of impropriety" may be
manifest not only in a judge's professional life but also his private
life, suggesting that the" judge's extrajudicial associations and
activities may be closely scrutinized by the public as well. 68 The
drafters reduced the vagueness that some allege is associated with
the "appearance of impropriety" clause by explaining that the
"appearance of impropriety" is usually accompanied by violation
69
of another rule under any of the Canons. 1
162

Id. at Canon 1.03.

163 ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2004), Canon 2 (Commentary).
164 REVISED DRAFT TO THE

ABA

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 1

(2005).
165 SHAMAN, supra note 8, at 310.
166 Id.at 313.
167 REVISED

DRAFT ABA MODEL

CODE

(Comment2)(2005).
168 See id. at Canon 1.03 (Comment 1).
169 See id. at Canon 1.03 (Comment 2).

OF JUDICIAL

CONDUCT,

Canon 1.03
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This change lessens judicial restrictions drastically in its own
right. Without the requisite state of mind and actual conduct, a
judge may not be subject to the penalties of a Code violation, even
if his conduct appears itself as improper to the general public.
Accordingly, the judge is given new and significant leeway with
which to operate in his public and private life, even if he appears
to engage in inappropriate conduct. 170 As long as a judge does not
violate other Code sections, the appearance of impropriety alone is
not likely to be punishable.
The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct do even more to
stress that the appearances of impartiality and independence
should be maintained. In its preamble, two of the reasons listed
for the necessity of such international principles governing judicial
conduct are that "public confidence in the judicial system and in
the moral authority and integrity of the judiciary is of the utmost
importance in a modern democratic society," and "it is essential
that judges, individually and collectively, respect and honour
judicial office as a public trust and strive to enhance and maintain
confidence in the judicial system.""' In fact, four of the six
Values espoused by the international principles stress the
importance of appearing to be independent
or impartial from the
72
view of the reasonable observer. 1
The Bangalore Principles require that: "[a] judge shall not only
be free from inappropriate connections with, and influence by, the
executive and legislative branches of government, but must also
appear to a reasonable observer to be free therefrom;"' 173 "[a] judge
shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court,
maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal
profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the
judiciary;"' 7 4 "[a] judge shall ensure that his or her conduct is
above reproach in the view of a reasonable observer;"' 175 "[t]he
behavior and conduct of a judge must reaffirm the people's faith in
170 But which may not be punishable as such because some sort of accompanying
actual impropriety is required.
171 BANGALORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, at Preamble.
172 See id.at Values 1.3, 2.2, 3.1, 3.2, and 4.1.

173 Id.at Value 1.3.
174 Id. at Value 2.2.
175 Id.at Value 3.1.
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the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but
must also be seen to be done;"' 76 and "[a] judge shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge's
activities.' 7 7 Unlike the ABA Model Code, which stresses that
the appearance of impropriety usually accompanies another Code
violation, the Bangalore Principles suggest that the appearance of
impropriety alone constitutes an ethical violation. Therefore, the
drafters espoused a blanket prohibition on the appearance of
impropriety in Value 4.1.178
However, according to the ABA Model Code, a judge must not
be so concerned about the public's perception of him that he
refrains from correctly and equally applying the law, merely to
satiate the public's desire for a particular outcome. 179 It is
recognized that a judge is not appointed or elected to make
popular decisions that the public will always approve. 180 In
contrast to the legislative branch, the judicial branch exists to
apply the law in the manner that is required, even if the outcome is
unpopular. 181 By first having a duty to the law, the appearance of
fairness is maintained. In Comment 1 of Canon 4, the revised
ABA Model Code further stresses the importance of conduct
consistent with the Code by encouraging judges to engage in
extracurricular activities that promote the scholarship and
discourse of judicial ethics.' 82 In this manner, the ABA Model
Code places value on the appearance of appropriate judicial
conduct.
The judge is not above the law. The judge must "respect and
comply with the law."' 183 In other words, the prestige associated
with the judge's position does not grant him special favors
inconsistent with the law. If it did, the public would lose
confidence and faith in a judiciary infused with integrity,
176 Id. at Value 3.2.

177 BANGALORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, at Value 4.1.
178 See id.

179 ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(B)(2) (2004).
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 REVISED DRAFT ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 4 (Comment

2) (2005).
183 Id. at Canon 1.04.
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impartiality, and independence.
The ABA Model Codes-both the old and revised versionsas well as the Bangalore International Principles of Judicial
Conduct, do much to maintain demanding standards for judicial
conduct, whereas the revised North Carolina Code immediately
lessens restrictions on judges in the opening Canon. In fact, the
North Carolina Code only requires "appropriate standards of85
conduct," '18 as opposed to the more exacting "high standards"'
set forth by the Model Codes. It is indeed questionable whether
the lower "appropriate" standard guarantees that the Code's
objectives of integrity and independence will be met. Lowering
the standards required to meet such grandiose interests appears
counterintuitive at best. Moreover, the North Carolina Code is
concerned only with the judiciary's actual integrity and
independence; there is no mention that the appearance of integrity
or independence factors into the equation.1 86 This is problematic
in that the state has always expressed an interest in a judiciary that
appears independent and impartial. Moreover, even though public
confidence in the judiciary is not mentioned in the majority
opinion of White, there are several references to confidence in the
dissenting opinions, which suggests that public
confidence in the
187
interest.
state
compelling
a
remains
judiciary
The North Carolina Code creates confusion for judges who sit
in North Carolina because it is unclear to, exactly "appropriate
standards of conduct ' refers. If appropriate standards simply
refer to abiding by the restrictions found in the Code, as is likely,
then the use of the word "appropriate" lends the appearance that
the Canons are mere suggestions of acceptable behavior, rather
than enforceable rules. On the other hand, if "appropriate
standards of conduct" refer to the manner in which a judge should
conduct himself, then the suggestion is that a judge cannot conduct
184 NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT,

Canon 1 (2003).

185 ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 1 (2004); see also REVISED
DRAFT ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 1.01 (Comment 1) (2005).

186 See NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 2 (2003) (failing to
explicitly mention the appearance of impropriety as a code violation, but maintaining
that public confidence is important only insofar as it is achieved through actual
impartiality and independence).
187 White, 536 U.S. 765, 801.
188 NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 1 (2003).
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himself "appropriately" and be in violation of the rulessomething more akin to actual impropriety would be needed for a
rule violation. Yet, the use of the word "appropriate" is vague
because it departs from the "high standards" that have been
traditionally required. Even though "high standards" themselves
may not be a clear guide for behavior, the advantage of retaining
this standard is that a body of case law has developed which
interprets what "high standards" actually mean.
The most notable change to the North Carolina code was the
removal of the prohibition on the "appearance of impropriety."
The use of "appearance of impropriety" began with the 1972 ABA
Model Code, i89 and continued with the 1990 ABA Model Code, as
well as recent Code revisions.' 90 Although the importance of the
appearance of impartiality of the judiciary has traditionally been
valued, it comes as no surprise that the North Carolina Supreme
Court made this change to its Code when it did. Recently, more
and more courts found clauses in judicial canons invalid as a
matter of vagueness. The reason the "appearance of impropriety"
could be considered vague is because it provides no notice of what
types of conduct would be sufficient to violate this Canon.'91
Attempts to curtail vagueness are found throughout criminal
law, mainly because of the belief that citizens are entitled to notice
of what constitutes punishable conduct, precisely because the
penalties associated with crimes are so great.' 92 But penal law is
distinguishable from the laws governing judicial conduct. With
judicial conduct, we are not as concerned with the penalties for
improper conduct. We are more concerned about the important
role of proper judicial conduct. It is necessary to hold judges to
higher standards in order to counteract any type of behavior that
189 See ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 2 (1972).

190 See ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 2 (1990); ABA MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 2 (2004); REVISED DRAFT ABA MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 1.03 (2005).

191 Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Commission on the Rules of
Professional Conduct, http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/notices/reports/2002finalreport
.pdf at 5; see generally Ruth Woodruff, Memorandum, http://www.abanet.org
/judicialethics/resources/memo-woodruff_ 101703.pdf at 2.

192 In re Banks, 244 S.E.2d 386, 388 (1978) (citing Pierce v. US, 314 U.S. 306
(1941)) (1978) (advancing the notion that a criminal statute "must be couched in
appropriate definiteness").
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would make us doubt our judiciary's capacities to decide fairly
and independently.'93 Therefore, it may be necessary to restrict
some individual rights in order to achieve the appearance of justice
in judicial conduct.'94 The benefit that flows from the practice of
retaining sections of the code that have been in place for years is
that the accumulation of case law on point provides notice about
the types of conduct that are disreputable, which, in the aggregate,
has the effect of reducing vagueness.
B. Ex ParteCommunications
The drafters of the ABA Model Code espoused the view that
"It]he judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all the
judge's activities."' 95 The Model Code retains language that
continues to restrict the speech of judges, especially with regard to
96
ex parte communications about pending or impending litigation.1
It also restricts public comment on such impending litigation that
reasonably impairs the fairness of the action before the court. 97 In
taking these steps, the drafters of the ABA Model Code protected
public confidence in the judiciary by preventing judges from
making biased statements about litigation likely to come before
the court, 198 but did not make this clause overly broad or vague,
limiting "impending" to cases that were anticipated' 99 to come
before the court. 200 Also, the drafters retained the language
"reasonably," which means that the reasonable person standard
applies to whether the nature of ex parte communications or public
statements would give the public the impression that such
communications or statements are improper.
The drafters of the proposed revisions to the Code recognize
that certain ex parte communications may give at least the

193 See American Judicature Society, The Need for Hortatory Standardsfor Judicial
Conduct, http://www.ajs.org/ajs/ajs-editorial-template.asp?contentid=245.
194 Id.
195 ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(A) (2004).
196

Id. at Canon 3(B)(7).

197 Id. at Canon 3(B)(9).
198 For example, impending cases.
199 Suggesting "very likely" and not just "somewhat foreseeable."
Canon 3(B)(9) (2004).

200 See ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT,
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impression of impropriety.2 ' In fact, the Model Code revision
would apply a ban on all ex parte communications, either pending
or impending, except for extreme instances.20 2 Reliance on ex
parte communications to resolve issues gives the impression that
the judiciary is not operating independently of outside influences.
Communications about a potential disputed issue necessarily
creates some sort of belief or bias in the judge, which could be
reasonably interpreted by the public to be bias or prejudice against
particular parties.20 3 If this is the case, then such communications
about impending proceedings may have the effect of eroding the
public's confidence in the judiciary by creating the impression that
"[judicial] decision-making is ...subject to inappropriate outside
influences. ' ' 2°
The drafters of the ABA Model Code also recognize that the
"impending" restriction is not so restrictive as to prohibit
discussion of any case that could potentially come before any
court. To do so would be to unduly restrict the First Amendment
rights of judges. In fact, the ABA reads "impending" loosely, as
only including proceedings that are "anticipated but not yet
commenced. 2 0 5 A prime example mentioned by the drafters
includes "a case [that] may be filed . . .[for] a crime . . .being
investigated but no charges have been brought, or if someone has
been arrested but not yet charged., 20 6 As long as no one is being
charged or arrested in regards to a particular issue, this means that
a judge may talk about issues that can be reasonably anticipated.2 7
However, because the ban on discussing impending proceedings
applies to proceedings in all courts, not merely the court or

201 See REVISED DRAFT ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT,

Canon 2.10

(2005).
202 Id. at Canon 2.10(A)(1-5). Note that there are exceptions for scheduling,
administrative purposes, or emergencies. Id. at Canon 2.10, Comment 4.
203 The White Court held that expressing viewpoints against certain parties was
impermissible as it pertained to judicial elections. The generalization of this holding to
other judicial communications may be reasonable.
204 REVISED DRAFT ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 2.07,
Comment 2 (2005).
205 Id. at Canon 2.11, Comment 2.
206 Id.
207 Id.
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jurisdiction in which the judge presides,20 8 the restriction is
broadened. A judge must pay attention to the proceedings in all
jurisdictions if he is to be afforded the protection offered by the
rule.
The drafters of the Bangalore Principles did not directly speak
to the question of ex parte communications or public comments.20 9
However, "[a] judge shall not, in the performance of judicial
duties, by words or conduct, manifest bias or prejudice towards
any person or group on irrelevant grounds., 210 Thus, if in ex parte
statements or communications a judge presents a bias toward a
person or group, then that judge would be in violation of Value 5.
Presumably, if Value 5 did not cover such communications, then
Value 4.1 could cover any prohibited activity if the judge exuded
an appearance of impropriety through any sort of communication
that presented impartiality against a party.21'
The North Carolina Supreme Court, on the other hand,
liberalized rules on what a judge is allowed to communicate in
North Carolina's old code prohibited public
Canon 3.212
comments about pending or impending cases, but the revised code
only prohibits judicial speech about pending cases.2 13 This change
likely occurred because of the vagueness associated with
"impending cases" and what that language actually includes. The
North Carolina Supreme Court may have been concerned that
judges would not be able to sufficiently predict the cases likely to
come before the court, and thus they were not put on notice about
what they were permitted and prohibited to discuss.2 14 Moreover,
the revisions to Canon 3 allow judges to make ex parte
communications about impending actions, and the standard for

208 Id. at Canon 2.11 (A).
209 See generally BANGALORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 18.

210 Id. at Value 5.2. Note also that this clause implicitly contains the White
opinion's definition of impartiality as applying only against parties and not against
issues, per se.
211 See id. at Value 4.1.
212 See NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(A)(6) (2003).

213 Id.

214 However, nothing precluded the North Carolina Supreme Court from limiting
their definition of impending cases to those actions that were "anticipated" instead of all
likely cases or issues to come before the court.
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'
pending actions was reduced to "knowingly."215
Presumably, an
inadvertent communication about a pending action before a judge
would be tolerable.
However, further extending the class of judicial
communications that are protected may ultimately result in the
creation of an appearance of impropriety, which is simultaneously
undesirable from the view of the state2" 6 but also now permitted
under North Carolina law.217 For example, if a judge consistently
speaks to a certain law school professor about particular issues, it
may appear that the judge is biased, especially if that professor is
known to have salient views about a topic. Many law school
professors, especially ones who are on the cutting edge of their
areas of practice, are often called upon to make regular guest
appearances on television news broadcasts on which they espouse
one opinion or another with regard to the law. Thus, this type of
communication provides the public with the appearance that the
judge is formulating opinions in regard to cases that are likely to
come before him, rather than independently deciding the case
based on the facts and the relevant law at the time the case is
heard.
Under the revised North Carolina Code, expressing
opinions in regard to impending litigation is not expressly
prohibited, even though it perpetuates conduct unbecoming of a
judge and suggests impropriety.218 This is problematic because it
could erode the public's confidence in the judicial system.

C. Disqualificationof Judges and Reasonableness
Under the revised North Carolina Code, the North Carolina
Supreme Court implicitly read the reasonable person standard out
of all of the Canons, even if "reasonable" language was retained
by the revisers of its Code.2 19 For example, the North Carolina
revised Canon 3 reads, "On any motion of any party, a judge
at Canon 3(A)(4) (2003).
As noted by Comment A to Canon 2, which underscores the importance of the
public's confidence in the judiciary. See id. at Canon 2 (Comment A).
217 Id. at Canon 2 (note also Canon 2's conflicting comment).
218 See generally id. at Canon 3(A)(6) (failing to expressly prohibit formulation of
opinions with regard to impending litigation).
219 See, e.g., NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(C)(1) (2003)
(continuing to retain language pertaining to "reasonableness").
215 NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
216
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should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality
may reasonably be questioned. '22 0 The ABA Model Code, on the
other hand, applies a reasonable person standard, for
disqualification as well as other matters.22'
North Carolina's revision is noteworthy for two reasons. First,
the revision creates a duty for the parties to make a motion for the
judge to disqualify himself.
Therefore, the burden of
disqualification is removed from the judge's shoulders, although
Canon 3(D) adds the language that "a judge . . . [may] . .
disqualify himself . . . upon his own initiative. 222 Even so,

notwithstanding a judicial conflict under Canon 3, a judge may
still sit on a case that he or she has an interest in, given that the
parties determine that the "basis for potential disqualification is
immaterial."223
Second, even though the North Carolina Supreme Court
retained the language of reasonableness in this Canon, it
completely disregarded reasonableness in its interpretation of the
Canon when a case on point was brought before the court.22 4 Such

an interpretation is confusing because it sends dual messages to
judges in the state. Even though the North Carolina Supreme
Court explicitly removed the admonition that judges should avoid
the "appearance of impropriety,, 225 the "appearance of
impropriety" standard has been left intact with the language that
disqualification becomes mandatory if the judge's "impartiality
may reasonably be questioned., 226 Thus, a judge could conclude
that a reasonable person standard applies when judicial
disqualification is appropriate.
Yet, the North Carolina Supreme Court interpreted the
220

NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT,

Canon 3(C)(1) (2003). The old

clause read, "A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned." NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon

3 (1996).
221 ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(E)(1) (2004).
222 NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(D) (2003) (note the

permissive language used).
223 Id. at Canon 3(D).
224 Lange v. Lange, 357 N.C. 645, 649 (2003) (interpreting the Canon as if the term
"reasonableness" was not included).
225 Id. at Canon 2.
226 Id. at Canon 3(C)(1).
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language it created regarding the reasonable person standard 227 as
only including actual impartiality. 228 The Supreme Court asks that
the same standard previously used be applied to new cases before
2
courts. 29 However, it tells the Court of Appeals, which applies the
standard on remand, what the standard is. 230 The question then
becomes, when, if at all, did the standard change? Did the
standard change as a result of the revision to Canon 2 in 2003,
which struck language of the "appearance of impropriety"? Did
this simple revision have the effect of eliminating all reasonable
person standards as previously applied, under the Code? And why
did the North Carolina Supreme Court in 2003 choose to keep the
language for Canon 3 intact (replete with references to a
"reasonable" standard), when it made explicit changes to Canon 2?
Reconciliation of North Carolina's Canons 2 and 3, using
statutory language as well as accompanying case law, poses a
difficult challenge. However, these Canons can be reconciled in a
number of potential ways: (1) the Supreme Court might intend that
all "appearance of impropriety" language, including reasonable
person standards, were eliminated by the 2003 Code amendments;

(2) the Supreme Court could have struck "appearance of
impropriety" from the Code and instead could have chosen to
retain "appearance of impropriety" in their interpretation of the
Code, as New York has done; or (3) judges must not avoid the
"appearance of impropriety" but in instances in which a party
See State v. Scott, 343 N.C. 313, 326 (1996) (requiring at least an appearance of
partiality on the part of the judge in order for disqualification to be appropriate); State v.
Fie, 320 N.C. 626, 628 (1987) (quoting Ponder v. Davis, 233 N.C. 699, 706, 65 S.E.2d
356, 360 (1951), "it is not enough for a judge to be just in his judgment; he should strive
to make parties and the community feel that he is just; he owes this to himself, to the law
and to the position he holds").
228 See Lange v. Lange, 357 N.C. 645, 649 (2003) (stating that the standard is
whether "ground for disqualification actually exist," and citing State v. Fie and State v.
Scott as examples in which this standard was put to use, and further stating that
"substantial evidence" must exist to demonstrate that the judge would be precluded from
ruling impartially).
229 See id.
227

230 Id. But the confusion of this opinion lies in the fact that the North Carolina
Supreme Court stated that "actual" impropriety was the standard while simultaneously
urging the Court of Appeals to use the standard it always used to determine whether
qualification was appropriate; though this would include an assessment of whether the
reasonable person would think that disqualification was appropriate.
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makes a motion, the judge must evaluate his ability to make an
impartial decision using a reasonable person standard.23'
The North Carolina Supreme Court opted for the first
interpretation. Such amendments to the Code, made because the
North Carolina Supreme Court predicted that their Code would be
challenged as unconstitutionally vague, do no more to enlighten
judges of what conduct is permitted and what conduct is
prohibited. The North Carolina Supreme Court created a code of
judicial conduct that can be interpreted in several different ways,
which ultimately serves to confound all who must apply or adhere
to its Canons. Therefore, because the rules espoused in the Code
are themselves vague, judges must operate under standards that
completely or partially fail to inform them of what conduct is
appropriate; when judges themselves are confused about how to
act, the public's confidence in the judiciary can only inevitably
suffer as a result.
The dual role that the North Carolina Supreme Court serves in
this debate is troublesome. The Supreme Court has the power to
create and alter the Code, as well as the power to interpret the
Code.2 32 This poses two problems. First, this very practice upsets
the liberty afforded through separation of powers. Second, in its
Canon interpretation, the Supreme Court contradicts itself by
failing to follow the language of the Canon that it drafted. The
very practice of allowing judges to write their own Codes of
conduct and then interpret them subsequently may have the effect
of eroding the public's confidence in the judiciary a priori.
According to the Bangalore Principles, a judge shall conduct
himself in a manner such that the occasions for disqualification
will be "minimized., 233 In stark contrast to North Carolina, the
Bangalore Principles recognize that "[a]s a subject of constant
public scrutiny, a judge must accept personal restrictions that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should

231 Note that this is not a problem in the U.S. Supreme Court. Disqualification of
justices on the U.S. Supreme Court does not follow the reasonable person standard but
rather the standard of the individual judge whose impartiality is being questioned. The
judge himself must decide whether he can decide fairly and impartially in the case before
him.
232 N.C. GEN. STAT., § 7A-10.1 (2003).
233 BANGALORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, at Value 2.3.
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do so freely and willingly., 234 Thus, if unable to decide a matter
impartially, or if a reasonable observer would believe that a judge
is unable to decide a matter impartially, then a judge must
disqualify himself.2 5 Accordingly, the Bangalore Principles, like
the ABA Model Code, retain a reasonable person standard for
disqualification, and because of this, the public's confidence in the
judiciary is not likely to decline.
D. FinancialInterests
The North Carolina Supreme Court amended Canon 3
allowing judges far more financial interests before a conflict
develops. 236 The old Code stated, "'Financial interest' means
237
ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small,
which implied that even a negligible interest would be sufficient to
question the judge's impartiality. The Code was revised in 2003
to define "Financial interest" as a "substantive legal or equitable
interest[s] . . . that would be significantly8affected in value by the

23
outcome of the subject legal proceeding.,
This drastic change has the effect of only requiring judicial
disqualification when the financial interest is substantial,
regardless of whether the appearance of impropriety exists because
of a financial interest. This change serves to make it easier for
judges to live normal lives without a great threat of
disqualification for every case on which they sit. In this day and
age, judges typically have many small investments; if every small
investment was the subject of disqualification proceedings, it
would make it difficult for the judicial system to work because the
number of judges able to sit on a given case might be dramatically
reduced. In making changes to this Canon, the Supreme Court
removed the "proprietary interest of a policyholder in a mutual
insurance company," as well as "ownership of government
securities" as "financial interests," presumably because such

234

Id. at Value 4.2.

235 Id. at Value 2.5.
236 NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT,

Canon 3(C)(3)(c) (2003).

237 NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT,

Canon 3 (1996) (emphasis

added).
238 NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT,

added).

Canon 3 (2003) (emphasis
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interests are so common to the bench and could potentially

disqualify a range of judges from hearing a particular case.239
Similarly, the Supreme Court amended Canon 3 to exempt
additional positions from being considered "financial interests. 24 °
The Code was modified so that judges may participate as officers
in cultural and historical organizations.241 In line with the general
spirit of the modified Canon 3, this change provides the judge with
additional interests before they pose a conflict.242 The fact that
judges belong to various organizations and have lives independent
of the judiciary prompted this change. Disqualification of a judge
every single time a case comes before him in which he has any
interest, especially in small jurisdictions, would have negative
implications both for the public confidence in the judiciary and for
the state of the law in any given jurisdiction. Such a policy would
unfairly increase caseloads for judges with few or small outside
interests.
However, North Carolina chose to invoke a policy permitting
judges to decide cases in which they had some interest243 rather
than completely restricting them from having certain interests and
belonging to certain organizations. The latter is a better policy
because mere membership in an organization of a certain type may
be sufficient to erode the public's confidence in the judiciary, if
organization
membership
reasonably
questions
judicial
impartiality. Nevertheless, by amending Canon 3 in this manner,
the North Carolina Supreme Court implicitly suggested that the
right of the judge to engage in the activities that he so chooses in
his private life outweighs any such interest in the public's
confidence in the judicial system.
The Bangalore Principles, on the other hand, require that a
judge keep himself abreast of his investments and financial
interests.24 Although Value 4 does not specify how much of a
financial interest leads to mandatory disqualification of the judge,
the Value, as written, appears flexible. That is, if the reasonable
239 See id. at Canon 3.
240 Id. at Canon 3(C)(3)(c)(ii).
241 Id. at Canon 4.
242 Id. at Canon 3, 4.
243 How small is yet to be determined.
244 BANGALORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, at Value 4.7.
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person thinks that the quantification of the financial interest leads
to even the appearance of impropriety, then the judge will seem
unable to be impartial; thus, disqualification would be required.245
E. ExtracurricularActivities
More than ever, the ABA Model Code permits judges to
maintain personal lives and become involved in extracurricular
activities to an extent consistent with the performance of judicial
duties.
The ABA Model Code permits extracurricular
involvements so long as the involvements do not "cast reasonable
doubt on the judge's capacity to act impartially as a judge. 2 46 The
ABA's retention of the word "reasonable" indicates that the
reasonable person standard applies, which means that the
appearance of impartiality continues to be an important state
interest. The ABA takes a conservative view of the types of
avocational activities in which a judge is allowed to participate.247
A judge may discuss justice-related issues as well as nonlegal
subjects, but in doing so, must adhere to the other requirements of
the Code.248
In commentary, the ABA drafters suggest that this rule serves
the purpose of "remind[ing] judges that the use of permissive
language in various sections of the Code does not relieve a judge
from the other requirements of the Code that apply to the specific
conduct., 24 9 Therefore, as long as a judge is in compliance with
the other sections of the Code, he or she may "speak, write,
lecture, teach and participate in other extra-judicial activities. , '250
Thus, under the Model Code, written or oral discussion of certain
subjects may demonstrate the appearance of impropriety and
manifest a Code violation, especially when accompanied by an
actual Code violation.2
The ABA Model Code also specifies what duties are allowed
245 Id. at Values 4.7, 4.1, 2.5.
246 ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 4(A)(1) (2004).

247 See id. at Canon 4(B).
248 Id.

249 Id. at Canon 4(B) (Commentary).
250 ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 4(B) (2004).
251 See ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 2(A) (Commentary)
(2004).
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of a judge who holds a position as an "officer, director, trustee or
nonlegal advisor, or as a member or otherwise" in various
organizations. 252 A judge may assist in fundraising and fund
investment and management 253 and "mak[ing] recommendations to
public and private fundgranting organizations ... concerning the
law. 254 Such duties are permissible under the Model Code if the
judge does not personally solicit for organization membership in a
manner that is apparently coercive, using the prestige associated
with the office for organization fundraising purposes.255
In 2003, the North Carolina Supreme Court modified Canon 4
to allow judges to participate in a wider range of extracurricular
activities. The language was changed from "[a] judge may engage
in activities to improve the law, the legal system or the
administration of justice"25 6 to "[a] judge may participate in
cultural or historical activities or engage in activities concerning
the legal, economic, educational, or governmental system, or the
administration of justice. '' 2" As a result of this change, a judge is
now able to engage in activities so long as they do "not cast
substantial doubt on his capacity to decide impartially. 2 8 Before
2003, however, "substantial" was not included in the clause,
suggesting that if a judge's activities cast any doubt on his
impartiality, no matter how small, a code violation could result.
Since 2003, a judge can have a significant interest in an
organization, even by "participat[ing] in its management and
investment decisions," without creating a conflict under Canon
4.259 This change is in line with requiring more than just the mere
"appearance of impropriety" to create a code violation, which
permeates North Carolina's Code. 26
252 Id. at Canon 4(C)(3)(b).
253 See id. at Canon 4(C)(3)(b)(i).
254 Id. at Canon 4(C)(3)(b)(ii).
255 Id. at Canon 4(C)(3)(b)(iii-iv).
256 NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon
257 NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT,

4 (1996).

Canon 4 (2003).

258 Id.
259 Id.

260 See generally NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2003) (creating a

more exacting standard for impropriety and suggesting that its mere appearance will not
result in a code violation).
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Alternatively, the Bangalore Principles maintain an even
higher standard for judges, recognizing both that judges are still
entitled to rights like other citizens,26' but that a judge must always
be mindful of the dignity and duties associated with his judicial
position.2 62 Accordingly, if a judge's exercise of his personal
rights reduces the dignity of the bench, then a code violation may
occur if his actions fall under the blanket rule prohibiting the
appearance of impropriety.263 Thus, the Bangalore Principles are
much more stringent in this regard than their American
counterpart.
F. Extra-judicialDuties
North Carolina also revised Canon 5 in 2003 from "[a] judge
should regulate his extra-judicial activities to minimize the risk of
conflict with his judicial duties' 264 to "[a] judge should regulate his
extra-judicial activities to ensure that they do not prevent him from
carrying out his judicial duties. 265 Again, this change broadens
what a judge is allowed to do before a conflict arises, because
Canon 5 allows judges to participate in political parties and
political events. This change occurred despite the fact that the
General Assembly mandated nonpartisan elections for the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, District Courts, and Superior
Courts through the Judicial Reform Act of 2001.266 This change to

the Code effectively made de jure nonpartisan elections de facto
partisan ones by allowing judges to participate in political
organizations of his or her choosing.
The language stating that a judge "may not actively assist such
an organization 267 in raising funds, 22668 has the effect of loosening
judicial restrictions on solicitation-type behavior which, in the

261

See BANGALORE

262

Id. at Value 4.2.

263

Id. at Value 4.1.

PRINCIPLES,

supra note 18, at Value 4.6.

264 NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT,

Canon 5 (1996).

265 NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT,

Canon 5 (2003).

266 See Judicial Reform Act, S.1054 (2001).
267 NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5(B)(2) (2003). This
includes any cultural, educational, historical, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic
organization.
268 Id. at Canon 5.
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past, was absolutely banned. 269 The problem with the new clause
is that it does not clearly detail which types of solicitation
behavior are permissible and consistent with the Code and which
are not. However, it is clear is that inactive solicitation, whatever
its definition, would not constitute a Code violation.
The problem is that the Code draws no distinction between
what constitutes active and inactive solicitation. The vagueness in
the revised clause can be demonstrated as follows: Suppose a
judge has a young daughter who participates in the Girl Scouts.
When the judge goes door to door with little Sally to help her sell
Girl Scout cookies, does this count as actively soliciting funds for
one of the organizations that falls within this Canon? What if the
judge takes the Girl Scout cookie order form to work and leaves it
on the break table, like so many other parents do?
Furthermore, nowhere in the revised Code does it mention
what is included under the term "solicitation.""27 "Solicitation," as
defined by the American Heritage Dictionary, is the act of
"seek[ing] to obtain by persuasion, entreaty, or formal
application. 27 '
Presumably, by this definition, convincing
neighbors to buy Girl Scout cookies might count as solicitation,
even though selling Girl Scout cookies may not raise the question
of whether the judge is or appears impartial.
G. Compensationfor Extra-judicialActivities
According to the ABA Model Code, a judge may receive
compensation for extra-judicial activities that he or she is involved
in as long as those activities are consistent with what is permitted
by the Code.272 The Model Code sets no dollar amount of what
should be reported. 273 The Model Code drafters did that because
they inserted "reasonable" wording into these clauses, which
suggests that a judge should only engage in extra-judicial activities
that are compensated to the point where the public remains
269

See

NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5

(1996).

270 See NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 7 (2003) (although

"solicitation" is defined in Canon 7, the writers of the Code make it explicit that this
definition only applies to Canon 7).
271 AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2004).
272 ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 4(H)(1) (2004).
273

Id.
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confident in an impartial judicial branch.
North Carolina, on the other hand, permits compensation, and
requires that the judge report compensation received if it exceeds
$2000.274 This change is consistent with the other changes made
to the North Carolina Code in 2003. In 2003, the Code changed
from prohibiting conduct that gave the de minimus suggestion of
partiality,2 75 to requiring substantial evidence in favor of actual
partiality.276 Regardless of whether a judge makes $2 dollars,
$200, or $2,000 from any such activity, it may be wise to have the
judge report all forms of compensation. Even compensation as
minimal as $2 dollars may appear to be improper, if not actually
be improper. The troubling aspect of North Carolina's revised
Canon 6 is that the section is infused with "reasonable"
terminology, 277 although the reasons for this are Unclear and run
counter to the Supreme Court's removal of Code language which
suggested that public confidence in an impartial judiciary was not
an important goal.
H. PoliticalConduct
The final canon pertains to political conduct inconsistent with
judicial office; it applies equally to judges and judicial candidates.
The ABA Model Code prohibits endorsement of candidates for
any office.27 8 The drafters indicate in the commentary that private
expression of views 279 on judicial and non-judicial candidates is
acceptable. 280 For the purposes of this Canon, it distinguishes
between private and public speech. The North Carolina Code, on
the other hand, expressly authorizes judicial candidates to
"endorse any individual seeking election to any office."2 81 This
change injects the judicial election process with more than a hint
of political flavor. Seemingly, a judicial candidate would be
allowed to endorse any political candidate and thereby make the
274 NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 6 (2003).
275 NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 6 (1996).
276 NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 6 (2003).

277 Id. at Canon 6 (A-B).
278 ABA MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5(A)(1)(b) (2004).
279 Note here that the term "endorsement" is not used.
280 ABA MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5(A), Commentary (2004).
281 NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 7(B)(2) (2003).
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election partisan, though politics are prohibited from entering
judicial analysis on the bench. Moreover, it allows judicial
candidates to endorse candidates, including politicians, equating
judicial candidates with politicians. This also makes judicial
candidates less independent. Accordingly, the North Carolina
Code, especially Canon 7(B), is so permissive that the public
confidence in the judiciary can only decline.
Owing to the impartial nature that judges are constitutionally
required to maintain,282 it is undesirable for a judge to speak on an
issue in such a manner that it becomes apparent that he or she
could not rule fairly. Various clauses have tried to counteract the
problem283 by prohibiting certain types of speech-first the
"Announce" clause, and then the "Pledges and Promises" and the
"Commit" clauses. The ABA Model Code joins clauses that
prohibit "pledges and promises" and "commit[ing]" to certain
issues likely to come before the court into a single clause.284
With the 2003 revision to the North Carolina Code of Judicial
Conduct, the Supreme Court struck the "Pledges and Promises"
language and failed to replace this clause with something stronger
or more in line with the White opinion. 285 Thus, in light of the fact
that the North Carolina Code is so lax, especially with regard to
campaign speech, it is possible that the Code opens up the
opportunity for judicial candidates to appear improper. Moreover,
it is also easier for judges to actually act improperly with
impunity, further eroding the public's confidence in the North
Carolina judiciary.
The ABA Model and North Carolina Code differ as to their
stances on a judicial candidate's direct solicitation of campaign
funds.
The ABA makes it clear that "[a] candidate for
appointment to judicial office or a judge seeking other
governmental office shall not solicit or accept funds, personally or
through a committee or otherwise, to support his or her

282

See US CONST. art. III.

Including the Announce clause, which was struck down as unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court in 2001 in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.
284 See ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2004).
283

285 Gass, supra note 1, at 7 (suggesting that removing overinclusiveness from an
announce clause may validate another form of the "Announce" clause).
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candidacy.,286 North Carolina struck this ban from its code upon
revision in 2003. North Carolina did something more than merely
strike the language of the code; it explicitly added that direct
solicitation is permissible political conduct for judges or judicial
candidates. 287 The sole case in which North Carolina finds it
necessary to ban direct solicitation is during some sort of political
event.288 Presumably, this ban was put in place because it
occurred to the Justices that if a judicial candidate solicited funds
during such an event, actual independence and impartiality would
be lacking. Thus, with regard to this revision, the Justices did not
have to consider perceived impropriety, because some sort of
actual impropriety would inevitably exist.
The problems with a judicial candidate's direct solicitation,
regardless of the circumstance, are overwhelming. First, such
conduct gives the impression that judges will favor campaign
contributors. 289 Indeed, judges are supposed to be impartial,
although they are only human and cannot simply disregard who
contributed to their campaign. Second, solicitation suggests that
judges and judicial candidates are using the
290 prestige associated
with their office for their own personal gain.
The solicitation issue is complicated.
What about the
constitutionality of prohibitions on direct solicitation by judicial
candidates? The Eleventh Circuit, for example, held, sua sponte,
that
Georgia's
limit
on
personal
fundraising
was
unconstitutional, 29 ' after ruling in Weaver that it is permissible for
judicial candidates to personally solicit campaign funds.292
The ABA bans nearly all types of political activity as well,
prohibiting attendance at political gatherings 293 and "speeches on
286 ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT,

Canon 5(B)(1) (2004).
Canon 7(B)(4) (2003).

287 NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT,
288

Id. at Canon 7(C)(1).

289

See Gass, supra note 1, at 17.

290

See

SHAMAN.

291 See Brief for Conference of Chief Justices in Support of Defendants-Appellees
as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees at 3, Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (2002)
(00-15158-DD), http://www.judicialcampaignconduct.org/decisions/WeaverCJAmicus
.PDF.
292 Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2002).
293 ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5(A)(1)(d) (2004).
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behalf of political organizations.' 294 Such political activity turns
judges into politicians and gives the public the impression that
judicial candidates will allow their political views to factor into
how they will decide cases once on the bench. This would run
directly counter to the state's interest in the appearance of
impartiality and independence, if not the state's interest in actual
impartiality and independence.
Of course, under the ABA Model Code, a judicial candidate is
not prohibited from belonging to a political party, but merely
cannot "act as a leader or hold an office in a political
organization.' 29 5 However, in North Carolina there is no limit as
to how involved a judicial candidate may be in a political
organization, so long as the candidate does not solicit money. The
Code permits a judicial candidate to "identify himself as a member
of a political party, ' 296 but whether a judicial candidate can
actually be a leader or hold an office in the political party is
debatable. Being the head of a political party conveys the
impression that the judicial candidate, if elected, will be partial
toward his political beliefs. However, holding a high office in a
political party may be acceptable under the North Carolina Code,
as long as actual impropriety does not result. Nevertheless, given
that North Carolina prohibits judicial candidates from personally
soliciting funds during political events, the state would also
probably acknowledge that holding a high position in a political
party would be too much and that, in this circumstance, actual
impropriety would exist.
The Bangalore Principles do not speak to the political conduct
of judges or judiciary candidates except insofar as that the
Principles prohibit the appearance of impartiality. Therefore, if a
judge running for re-election engages in certain campaign conduct,
he may commit a Value violation under 4.1.297 Presumably, the
294 Id. at Canon 5(A)(1)(c).
295

Id. at Canon 5(A)(1)(a).

Canon 7(B)(3) (2003) (if a
candidate identifies himself as a member of a political party the judicial elections will be
partisan, although elections for most courts in the state are supposed to be nonpartisan, as
created by statute).
297 See BANGALORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, at Value 4.1. But whether the
Bangalore Principles apply to judicial candidates is uncertain because there is no
language to that effect.
296 NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, at
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Bangalore Principles neglected this aspect because they assumed
that the blanket prohibition on the appearance of impropriety
would deter judges from inappropriate political conduct because
the drafters only contemplated systems of merit-based judicial
selection, or because the drafters meant the Principles to apply to a
wide range of judicial systems, many of which select their judges
in diverse ways.298
L

Result of Code Systems: Public Confidence in the
Judiciary

With all of these code modifications, the great diversity in
codes among the states, as well as courts interpreting important
code clauses as unconstitutional, what is the effect? Does the
American judiciary run efficiently and does the public perceive it
as effectively promoting justice? According to a 2001 Justice at
Stake poll, even though our judicial system works largely under its
own influence and no influence is exerted on the judicial branch,
only 61 percent of those polled indicated that they believed that
"independent" adequately reflected their view of judges.29 9
Similarly, 62 percent indicated that "impartial" was an adequate
descriptor. 300 Granted, these polls were taken before most of the
recent ethical changes in judicial conduct; however, with
loosening restrictions on judicial ethical conduct, these
percentages are likely to fall even more. It is necessary for
agencies and organizations to conduct ongoing evaluations of the
public's view of the judiciary in order to determine whether such
changes in ethical conduct directly affect the public's perception
of the judicial system as a whole.
The North Carolina Code is likely to reduce the confidence of
North Carolina citizens in its judiciary. The revisers of this Code
completely removed the "appearance of impropriety" language
and took out nearly all "reasonableness" standards.
Accordingly, actual impropriety is required for Code violations in
North Carolina, meaning that judges may evince inappropriate
298

See id. at Preamble.

299

Justice at Stake, supra note 21, at 5.

300

Id.

See North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct (2003) (removing the public's
confidence in the judiciary as an important state interest).
301
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conduct and not be punished for such conduct. Consequently,
public confidence in the judiciary will inevitably decline when
judges are not punished for acts that are or appear to be improper.
The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct is more stringent
and retains many standards based on "reasonableness. 3 °2 The
ABA Model Code also aims to protect the public's confidence in
the judiciary, and it does so by requiring judges to avoid the
appearance of impropriety. However, the ABA Model Code
drafters make the Code less restrictive by advancing that the
appearance of impropriety alone is rarely sufficient to amount to a
Code violation; therefore, the appearance of impropriety is
unlikely to be punishable, unless it accompanies other Code
violations.3 °3 In effect, this imparts more confidence in the
judiciary than citizens of North Carolina have. However, as the
ABA Model Code has grown more lenient over time, 30 4 net public
confidence in the judiciary may be reduced by the Code
modifications.
The Bangalore Principles, alternatively, do much to regulate
judicial conduct by retaining language that maintains public
confidence in the judiciary as an important goal. 30 5 By injecting
the Code with such suggestions, it is likely that if implemented
internationally, the Bangalore Principles will have the net effect of
increasing the public's confidence in the judiciary. However,
because the principles are so new, not enforceable, and exist
concurrently with other more lax codes, it is difficult to determine
what sort of effect their creation has had or will have on the
public's confidence in the justice system.
The American judicial system has always been one of the most
independent systems in the world. The judicial branch operates
virtually ungoverned, without direct or indirect interference or
regulation by the executive or legislative branches of
government.30 6 In fact, as discussed earlier, the North Carolina
302 See, e.g., ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(B)(9) (2004)

(emphasizing that judges should not engage in discourse about impending or pending
cases that "might reasonably be expected to affect [the case's] outcome").
303 See ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 2(A) (2004) (suggesting

that other code violations are evidence of impropriety).
304 For example, by violation.
305 See BANGALORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, Preamble.

306 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-10.1 (2003) (allowing the judiciary to make its

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

[Vol. 31

Supreme Court creates its own rules of judicial conduct and
interprets them.30 7 In contrast, the Japanese judicial system
operates with some degree of independence, but not as much as
the U.S. judiciary. In the following section, I outline how the
Japanese system, a system with less judicial independence and the
absence of explicit judicial regulations, functions.
VI. The Japanese Judiciary
This section focuses on the Japanese judiciary and takes a
historical as well as political perspective of how it operates. This
section introduces the rules governing the Japanese courts during
imperial times and goes to clarify the rules and procedures used in
the modern era. The Japanese Court system has a reputation for
being predictable and impartial, while operating without a code of
conduct.
Various hypotheses will be advanced about how
impartiality can and is maintained in a system that is devoid of a
judicial code of ethics.
A. Imperial Japan
The modern Japanese judicial system cannot be understood
without an inquiry into the imperial system that preceded it, even
though the imperial and modern systems are different.30 8 We gain
advances and insights into the modern Japanese judicial system by
noting the similarities between the imperial and modern system.
Moreover, the imperial system demonstrates the development and
evolution of the judiciary over time, as a predicate for the modern
system.
Like the modern judicial system, the imperial judicial system
derived its mandate from the Japanese Constitution.30 9 Judicial
independence from the political branches of government was
directly established by Article 57 of the 1889 Constitution and
thus has a long, though ill-attained, history in Japan.3 1 ° Under the
Constitution, the imperial judicial system fell directly under the
own rules of conduct).
307 Id.

308 J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts: A Comparative
Approach, THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES, 722 (June 1994).

309 Id. at 732.
310 Haley, supra note 23, at 16.
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supervision of the Ministry of Justice instead of being an

independent governmental entity. 3 ' The power of the Ministry of
Justice resided with the Emperor. 1 2 The 1889 Constitution set
forth that no judge could be dismissed from work except through a
criminal conviction or disciplinary disposition.3" 3 The substance
of this clause was further delineated through the 1890 Judicial
Organization Act.3 14

The Judicial Organization Act guaranteed court tenure because
the Minister of Justice could not on a whim transfer judges and
because judges could remain on the court as long as they could
perform all of their judicial duties.315 The Act also forced judges
to refrain from politically aligning themselves because political
activity was considered the inherent function of another part of
government.3 16 The Act prohibited affiliation with any political
party.3 17 Judges "on active service" were forbidden "to interest
themselves in any public involvement in political affairs" or "to
become members of any political party or association or of any
local, municipal, or direct assembly."3 18 Thus, there was no
requirement for mandatory retirement of judges and, in this
fashion, judges received job security through life tenure.319
Under the Act, judicial discipline could only occur if both a
judge behaved "egregiously" and if the High Court or Supreme
Court proceedings afforded the judge due process.3 20 This type of
great independence from other
judicial structure affordedeven
though courts themselves fell
governmental institutions,
under supervision of the Ministry of Justice."' This method of
judicial selection resembled merit selection, which is a common
311

Id.at 17.

312

Id. at 16-17.

313 Ramseyer, supra note 308, at 733 (referring to DAi-NIPPON TEIKOKU KEMPO

[The Constitution of the great Japanese empire], promulgated Feb. 11, 1889).
314 Ramseyer, supra note 308, at 733.
315 Id.
316

Haley, supra note 23, at 18.

317 Id.

318 Id. (quoting SAIBANSHO KoSEi Ho [Court Organization Law] (Law No. 6, 1890).
319 See Ramseyer, supra note 308, at 733.
320 Id.
321 Id.
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method for selecting judges in the U.S., especially in the federal
system. Accordingly, judges did not have to worry about being
transferred, fired, or disciplined because of unpopular decisions,
and this left judges free to apply justice in the appropriate
manner. 322 However, the imperial judicial system did not remain
independent for long.
By 1900, a group of unelected oligarchs held substantial power
over the members of the judiciary.323 The power the Japanese
oligarchs exerted over Japanese government was limitless. They
informally controlled many aspects of Japanese government,
including the military and the judiciary, because they derived their
power through association with the emperor.3 24 Thus, even though
it appeared that the imperial Japanese system functioned under the
doctrine of separation of powers when looking at the law,3 25 in
actuality the judiciary lacked much of the requisite independence.
Separation of powers was lacking in imperial Japan to the extent
that the executive branch and those associated with it exclusively
3 26
controlled the functioning of the judicial system.
In fact, the Japanese oligarchs rose to power much earlier than
the late nineteenth century. By 1892, the Japanese oligarchs were
already so powerful that they created what was then the judicial
system.327 For the next two decades, the oligarchs had exclusive
power to select judges.328 Unfortunately, the oligarchs selected
judges with little or no training, mainly because legal training was
rare in imperial Japan. 329 By the late nineteenth century, legal
training became more common, as the progressively developing
educational programs began specializing in legal education.33 °
322 Id.
323 Ramseyer, supra note 308, at 734. Their power was akin to that which the
Tammany Hall organization exerted over the New York courts during the same time
period.
324 Id. at 734.

325 E.g., the Constitution and the Judicial Organization Act of 1890.
326 The Judicial System, http://countrystudies.us/japan/l 18.htm [hereinafter The
JudicialSystem].

327 Ramseyer, supra note 308, at 734.
328 Id.
329 Id.
330 Id.
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The drastic increase of legally trained professionals prompted the
oligarchs to issue mandates
encouraging 158 ill-trained judges to
33
retire during the 1890s. 1
This practice, however, conflicted with the 1890 Judicial
Organization Act, which ordinarily guaranteed lifetime tenure, and
required a procedure in front of the High Court or Supreme Court
in order to effect the dismissal of a judge.332
Because the
proceeding took place in front of a court, the oligarchs had no
assurance that the courts would decide in their favor, especially
because the judges did nothing to make them traditional
candidates for dismissal.333 Instead, the oligarchs found it most
effective to bribe judges that they wished to replace. 334 The
Minister of Justice quickly promoted these judges to higher
positions with larger retirement pensions, 335 as long as they agreed
that they would retire soon thereafter.336 In 1899 for instance, the
Minister of Justice promoted fifteen judges to the twenty-nine
member Supreme Court.3 37 All fifteen of these judges retired
within three weeks of their promotion.338
The oligarchs lost much of their power by 1920 because of the
changing Japanese political landscape.339 While, at first glance,
this appears to be good news for the independence of the judiciary,
in reality it was not. 340 As oligarchs lost their power over
governmental institutions such as the judiciary, professional
politicians in the Diet-the Japanese equivalent of the U.S.
legislature-gained control.341 However, in 1931, the landscape
changed once again when Inukai Tsuyoshi became prime

331 Id.
332 Id.

333 Ramseyer, supra note 308, at 734.
334 Id.

335 Final salary was a large factor in determining retirement pensions for imperial
judges. Id.
336 See id.
337 Id. at 734-5.
338

Id. at 735.

339 Id.
340 Id.

341 Ramseyer, supra note 308, at 735.
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minister.342 Inukai completely dominated the courts, appointing
and removing judges at will in violation of the 1890 Judicial
Organization Act. 343 He appointed thirteen judges to the Supreme
344
Court and fired twenty-nine judges without proper process.
Accordingly, the imperial Japanese system was flawed because
the Minister of Justice and oligarchs operating under the emperor
exerted extreme force and control over the judiciary. A system so
replete with corruption and a lack of judicial independence
typically does not foster a favorable public perception. In sharp
contrast, the modem Japanese system does not suffer from any
overt corruption and enjoys an extremely positive public
perception of the judiciary.
B. Modem Japan
The modem Japanese Constitution grants courts "whole
judicial power., 345 In addition, "[a]ll judges shall be independent
in the exercise of their conscience and shall be bound by the
Constitution and the laws." 346 Judicial candidates must pass "an
entrance exam to the one national law school, the Legal Research
Typically,
and Training Institute ' 347 (hereinafter "LRTI").
between one and four percent of all test takers pass the exam. 348 A
small portion of those who graduate from the LRTI go on to
become judges, typically those from the top of the class.349
Judicial candidates apply for judicial jobs at the end of their legal
educations. 3 0 The Japanese Cabinet "delegates that power [to
select judges] to the Supreme Court Secretariat, the administrative
office of the courts." '3 5' However, the Cabinet and Prime Minister
342 Id. at 738.
343 Id.

344 Id.

345 Id. at 723 (quoting NIKON KOKU KEMPO [Constitution of Japan], promulgated
May 3, 1947).
346 Id.
347 J. MARK RAMSEYER & ERIC B. RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

8 (University of Chicago Press 2003) [hereinafter MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE].
348 Id.
349 Id.

350 Ramseyer, supra note 308, at 725.
351 MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 347, at 9 (citing THE COURTS

2005]

LIMITS ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

jointly appoint justices to fill vacant positions.352 The Supreme
Court is "the court of last resort with power to determine the
3 53
constitutionality of any law, order, regulation, or official act.
Article 81 of the Modem Japanese Constitution reads in pertinent
part:
The Supreme Court is also responsible for nominating judges to
lower courts, determining judicial procedures, overseeing the
judicial system, including the activities of public prosecutors,
and disciplining judges and other judicial personnel. It renders
decisions from either a grand bench of fifteen justices or a petit
bench of five. The grand bench is required for cases involving
constitutionality.354
Nearly all the LRTI judicial candidates are selected for judicial
positions.355 Because of this outcome, it appears that judicial
candidates are hired irrespective of political beliefs.
This,
however, may not be the case.356 The Secretariat may only hire

those with political views consistent with the Liberal Democratic
Party (hereinafter "LDP") and may refuse to hire those with
unorthodox views. 357 This theoretical model of judicial selection
is consistent with behavior fostered by corporate structures in both
the United States and Japan,358 where corporate officers work
mainly to promote shareholders interests.359 Alternatively, LRTI
graduates with opposing views may simply opt to work in the
private sector. 360

ACT, § 40).

See id. at 15. Supreme Court Justices are not immune from public input, though.
The public must approve the appointment through confirmation elections. While the
public retains the ultimate power to disapprove of a judicial appointment, Japanese
citizens have never voted against an appointment the Cabinet and Prime Minister have
made.
352

353 The Judicial System, supra note 326 (quoting NIHONKOKU KENPO [THE MODERN

JAPANESE CONSTITUTION], art. 81, para. 1).
354 The Judicial System, supra note 326 (emphasis supplied).
355 MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 347, at 9.
356 See id.

357 Id.
358 Id. at 9-10.
359 Id. at 10.
360 Id.at 9.
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C. CareerSystem
The Japanese system is a system of career judges."' This
means that judges are appointed early in life, usually in their midto late-twenties or after graduation from LRTI, and sit for the
remainder of their lives.36 2 This system differs greatly from the
U.S. system, in which judges are appointed or elected later in life,
usually after they have established successful careers in politics or
law.
When selected, judges sit for ten-year terms. 363 Lower court
judges have job stability and cannot be fired at will, although they
must retire when they reach the age of sixty-five. 364 Higher court
justices must retire by the time they reach seventy. This ultimately
creates a seniority system, when relatively older judges sit on the
Supreme Court but have relatively short terms.36 5

Confirmation

elections, elections in which the public votes to approve the
continued appointment of judges, take place every ten years,36 6 and

it is uncommon for judges to lose their seats in this manner. The
Cabinet also reserves the right to review each sitting judge at the
end of the ten-year term.3 67 The Cabinet has only failed to
reappoint two judges, though it is believed that many more judges
may have resigned because they felt that they would be denied
368
reappointment.
It is also rare for the Cabinet to dismiss a
9

judge.

36

Judges are rotated through judicial positions every two to three

361

Haley, supra note 23, at 1.

362 Id.
363

Ramseyer, supra note 308, at 725.

364 Id. at 723-24.
365 See MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 347, at 15. In fact, the
mean age of appointment is 64, so most Justices appointed to the Supreme Court do not
make it through the full ten-year term they are appointed for. Moreover, older Justices
are preferred for the Supreme Court from a political standpoint. Older appointees likely
have their political ideologies set in stone, and the LDP knows what to expect from them
based on their previous records.
366 Ramseyer, supra note 308, at 723.
367 Id. at

724.

368

Haley, supra note 23, at 5.

369

Ramseyer, supra note 308, at 724.

20051

LIMITS ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

years over the course of the ten-year period.37° As a result of these
judicial reassignments, a career judge usually serves on many
different types of courts throughout his life. Typically a judge will
go through two or three appointments to a major district court, one
or more appointments to family court, an appointment to a rural
branch court, and an appointment to a high court.37' Judges "spiral
upwards in terms of positions but they serve repeatedly in courts at
all levels from junior positions at the district level upward. 372
The emphasis on the career judiciary is especially crucial.
Eleven of the fifteen Justices sitting on the Supreme Court in the
late 1990s were career judges. 37 3 Traditionally one-third of judges
appointed to the Supreme Court are career judges, another onethird are appointed from the practicing bar, and the remaining
third are appointed as a result of "attainment in their profession
with knowledge of law., 374 These non-career judges are just as
likely to maintain the non-partisan views and decision-making
abilities as their career judge colleagues.375 Moreover, all
Supreme Court Chief Justices appointed since 1978 have been
career judges. 376 The notion that the judiciary is adverse to
political involvement within its ranks is evidenced by the fact that
only two lawyers have held office, one appointed in 1976 and the
other in 1977. 377 However, no true politician or political leader
has held office on the Supreme Court, suggesting that the
separation of politics from the judicial system is an important state
interest."'
The scope of justiciability is further limited by the newness of
Japan's modem MacArthur Constitution. 379 The 1947 Constitution
370 Id. at 725.

371 Haley, supra note 23, at 5.
372 Id.at 6.
373 Id. at 9.
374 Id. at 9.

375 Id. at 11.
376 Id. at 9.

377 Haley, supra note 23, at 10.
378 Id. at 14.

379 Dan Fenno Henderson, Japanese Judicial Review of Legislation: The First
Twenty Years, in TaE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN, ITS FIRST TWENTY YEARS, 1947-67

115,115 (Dan Fenno Henderson, ed. 1968).
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first presented courts with the opportunity to decide what pieces of
legislation were unconstitutional.380 Alternatively, under the Meiji
Constitution of 1889, the constitutionality of legislation and
statutes was determined by the ruling elite.38 ' In fact, under Meiji
rule, only disputes among private parties were brought before the
courts. 382 Thus, courts could ignore constitutional questions
because they lacked the jurisdiction to decide these cases when
separation of powers played a smaller role in governmental
affairs.383
Today Japanese judges still do not play a large role in
interpreting the Constitution, even though the Constitution
expressly grants them this role. 3 84 Moreover, the branches of
government are not thought to be separate and equal.385 In fact,
"[t]he executive branch in Japan is separate from but subordinate
to the Diet [i.e., the legislative body]."386
Japanese courts routinely refuse to answer constitutional
questions under the "political question" doctrine, regarding certain
cases as "highly political [in] nature which .

. .

possess an

extremely important relation to the existence of [the] country as a
sovereign nation. 387 While the "political question" doctrine exists
in American jurisprudence as well, American courts have not
overused this principle to such an extent so as to refuse to answer
questions of political relevance, such as whether there is a right to
abortion, a right to die, etc.
Accordingly, Japanese Constitutional jurisprudence remains
immature at best, because courts, though they have the ability to
adjudicate constitutional questions, have been reluctant to put this

380 Id.
381 Id.

382 Id.at 117.

383 See id.
384 See Ramseyer, supra note 308, at 723 (citing NIKON KOKU KEMPO [Constitution

of Japan], promulgated May 3, 1947).
385 Kisaburo Yokota, Political Questions and Judicial Review: A Comparison, in
THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN, ITS FIRST TWENTY YEARS, 1947- 67 141,143 (Dan Fenno
Henderson, ed. 1968).
386 Id.
387 HENDERSON, supra note 379, at 124 (quoting Japan v. Sakata, 13 Keishu 3225,

3234-35 (1959)).
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into practice.388 Furthermore, the courts have treated certain
questions as quasi-political questions, which do not invoke
political question status because of their express language, but
because of other issues that they spawn.389 In addition to refusing
to answer political questions, Japanese courts generally refuse to
answer quasi-political questions. 390 This area of law is not fully
developed, and it is unclear as to what amounts to a case or
controversy, the determining issue when deciding who has
standing to bring constitutional issues. As such, Japanese courts
will struggle with such issues when brought before them.39 '

Accordingly, Japanese Constitutional jurisprudence remains
immature at best.
Although the Japanese Diet reserves the power to impeach
judges for misconduct, there have been few successful
impeachments. 39'
Between 1948 and 1989, the Judicial
Impeachment Committee heard 5700 impeachment complaints,
but only decided against judges twelve times.393
Most
impeachment actions are brought by losing parties in disputes.394
Over the same period, the Cabinet only dismissed judges twice.3 95
Therefore, this trend shows that there is a movement to retain
judges, provided that they do not engage in gross misconduct.
D. JudicialImpartiality
The modem judiciary has had unbelievable success in Japan
because of its reputation for impartiality.396 Unlike judges in
imperial Japan, the judges under the modem regime do not take
388 See generally HENDERSON, supra note 379 (claiming that judges refuse to
adjudicate political questions).
389 See YOKOTA, supra note 385, at 155.
390 Id.

391 See HENDERSON, supra note 379, at 122.

392 Ramseyer, supra note 308, at 724. "To impeach, the Diet must find that a judge
grossly violated the standards of office, neglected the duties of the job, or dishonored the
institution of the courts." MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 347, at 125.
393 Ramseyer, supra note 308, at 724. This makes the impeachment rate, defined as
the number of impeachments per impeachment complaints, 0.2%.
394 Haley, supra note 23, at 15.
395 Ramseyer, supra note 308, at 724.
396 Actual or perceived or both. See Haley, supra note 23, at 14.

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

[Vol. 31

bribes and therefore avoid all appearances of corruption.397
Accordingly, there appear to be two different manners in which
the judicial system can lack independence. First, the judiciary can
be corrupted substantively from outside sources, and therefore
influenced by external groups or people. 398 Second, the judiciary
can lack independence because it is regulated or controlled some
way 399 by external groups or people. 400
The first manner
characterized imperial Japan.
The second manner will be
examined more thoroughly throughout this comment. It is
theorized that if the judiciary only lacks independence in its
procedure, then public confidence in the judiciary will remain
strong-and may even increase-because lack of complete
procedural independence operates as a check on the judicial
branch.
E. JudicialIndependence?
Accordingly, the idea that modern Japanese courts are not
inherently corrupted is not to say that the Japanese courts work
independently and without external influence.
The modern
Japanese judiciary has been greatly influenced by the fact that the
LDP remained in power continuously from 1955 to 1993.401 This
political stability in modern Japan, unlike the constant change
associated with imperial Japan, made the judicial system one of
the most predictable systems in the world.4 °2 The LDP controls
judges indirectly, through delegation to the Supreme Court
Secretariat,4 "3 through their power to reassign judges to different
courts.'
The LDP, through the court's administrative offices of
the Supreme Court Secretariat, controls geographical and
hierarchical rotations that a judge will be assigned to every two to
three years.4 5 In some ways, this works as a check on the judicial
397 Id.at 15.
398 See id. at 29.
399 For example, procedurally.
400 For example, the LDP. See Haley, supra note 23, at 26.
401 Ramseyer, supra note 308, at 723.
402 Id. at 722.
403 MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 347, at 9.

404 Ramseyer, supra note 308, at 725.
405 Id.
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branch, so that if judges manifest partiality for a particular party
appearing before them in court, that judge can be transferred to a
lower court. In other ways, this could work as a reward system for
judges who are theoretically impartial, or, if the LDP exerts some
sort of undue influence on the judiciary as a minority claim, those
who decide cases in a way favorable to or consistent with LDP
ideologies.4 °6 Judges, of course, are free to decline their transfer;
however, this refusal may come at a price.4 7 The most prestigious
positions in the Japanese judiciary are the Supreme Court, the
High Court, or administrative positions. 40 8 Thus, these positions
are most desirable and transfer to these positions is a promotion
rather than a demotion.
The Japanese system theoretically promulgates a seniority
system in which judicial assignments are used both to provide
judicial training and assessment. 4°9 As John Haley describes,
Japanese judges do not simply move upwards in a hierarchy of
courts. Rather, they spiral downwards in terms of positions but
they serve repeatedly in courts at all levels from junior positions
at the district level upward . . . . This pattern of spiraling
assignments ensures the continuous and pervasive influence of
senior judges
as mentors and monitors throughout the judicial
4 10
system.

The presence of senior judges on the lower courts serves as an
important and invaluable resource for junior judges who are new
to the system. This presence may only reestablish the great value
in deciding cases consistent with the LDP.4 11 Moreover, some
judges who have not let LDP preferences influence their decisions
have either retired or have led ordinary careers with upward
movement, or, alternatively, careers with lateral or downward

406

Id.

407 MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 347, at 10.
408

Id. at 12.

409 Vojtch Cepl and John N. Drobak, Norms, Culture, and the Rule of Law 7 (Sept.

1, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, http://www.isnie.org/ISNIE03/papersO3/drobaks.doc).
410 Haley, supra note 23, at 6.
411 As will be later demonstrated, the demotion of Japanese judges is positively
correlated with anti-government decisions.
See generally MEASURING JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE, supra note 347. Thus, in this case, the senior judges serve as examples
to the younger judges.
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movement.412
F. Public Confidence in the Judiciary
Despite the evidence that the LDP influences the Japanese
judicial system, the Japanese judiciary commands an especially
high degree of respect from the public.4t 3 The Japanese judicial
system is heralded as one of the finest in the world, and its judges
are frequently praised for remaining so honorable and respectable
in a system that functions in the absence of any Code that
regulates the conduct of judges and judicial candidates. 4 14 It
comes as no surprise that public confidence in the Japanese
judiciary is so high. Newspaper polls demonstrate that public trust
in the Japanese judiciary is second only to trust in procuracy and
the police. 415 This means that Japanese citizens place more trust
and confidence in their judiciary than their religious institutions,
defense institutions, political leaders who are members of the Diet,
and the Prime Minister.416
If the LDP influence is substantive, as Rasmeyer contends,
lack of judicial independence will surely pose a threat to public
confidence in the judiciary, and the aforementioned high degree of
public confidence in the Japanese judiciary is counterintuitive.
How, then, does the public retain extraordinary levels of
confidence in an institution that is influenced by outside sources,
namely the LDP? The Rasmeyer hypothesis will be detailed
below, as will an inquiry into whether the proposed LDP influence
is really substantive as alleged by the hypothesis.
G. The Rasmeyer Hypothesis
Law professors J. Mark Rasmeyer and Eric B. Rasmusen
advance this minority view that the Japanese judicial system
operates as an extension of LDP preferences and corresponding
disciplinary measures. In further empirical investigation they
asked "whether Japanese judges face career incentives with a

412 Ramseyer, supra note 308, at 727.
413 Haley, supra note 23, at 29.
414 See id.
415 Id. at 30.
416 Id.
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political bias. ' 4t 7 In this section, I assess the plausibility of this
minority view. Moreover, I assert that public confidence in the
judiciary can remain high even with less than complete judicial
independence.
Rasmeyer and Rasmusen advance the thesis that the LDP
could control the courts in ways that the public would not
notice.8 If LDP control is implicit and not readily observable by
the average Japanese citizen, then public confidence in the
judiciary may remain high when judicial independence is low.
Rasmeyer and Rasmusen demonstrate their hypothesis that the
LDP implicitly controls court decisions through their power to
transfer and reassign judges, with a general, widely applicable
example:
Suppose legislators can cheaply and effectively monitor and
If bureaucrats try to flout what
discipline bureaucrats.
legislators want, legislators can intervene and punish the
Because legislators can do so,
miscreant bureaucrats.
bureaucrats will have an incentive to give them what they want
in advance. If bureaucrats give legislators what they want,
legislators will have no reason to punish-bureaucrats will
regulate as legislators want them to, and legislators will largely
leave them alone. This would be true for any person, but
perhaps especially true for bureaucrats who care more about the
smooth running of their bureaucracies and their careers than
about particular policy outcomes or newspaper publicity.419
The authors further apply this example by referring to Kazuo
Ishiguro's novel The Remains of the Day. In the film, James
Stevens is a butler, and the son of a butler. His family has long
worked for the Darlington family. The heir to the Darlington
estate rarely tells Stevens what to do.
Instead, Stevens goes about his business on his own, with
scarcely a word of instruction from his titular master. Yet
Stevens is not independent. Lord Darlington leaves him alone
only because Stevens knows what Darlington wants done and
does it. Precisely because Darlington could discipline him and
Stevens knows that Darlington could, Stevens unquestioningly
417 Id. at 2.
418 MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note
419 Id.

347, at 17.
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fulfills Darlington's wishes. Precisely because Stevens correctly
anticipates Darlington's wishes, Darlington never intervenes.42°
The authors contend that such a problem is difficult to research
empirically. 42 1
However, the authors conceptualize their
hypothesis by selecting outcomes and variables, and performing a
multivariate analysis to answer the relevant question.422
Depending on the results of such analyses, dramatic flaws in the
Japanese judicial system may be brought to light and may
overshadow the positive aspects of the highly regarded judiciary.
For what good is it that the public remains confident in their
judicial system when judges fail to preserve independence in the
application of the law? After all, an ignorant yet institutionally
confident public is the greatest insurance for the maintenance of
the status quo. What can other judicial systems learn from strong
judicial systems, if they do not take into account their weaknesses?
H. ConstitutionalCases
In general, the Japanese judicial system is not faced with cases
that are as politically charged as those found in the United States.
However, there is a politically charged subject with which the
Japanese courts must deal. This subject deals with Article 9423 of
the modem Japanese Constitution.424 It reads in pertinent part,
"land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never
be maintained. 4 25 The LDP as well as the Supreme Court
consistently interpret this Article as prohibiting offensive force
only. 426 Under this interpretation, defensive force is perfectly
satisfactory.
Accordingly, a Self-Defense Force (hereinafter
"SDF") was created.427 An anecdote regarding a case on this
subject supports the Rasmeyer hypothesis.428
420

Id. at

421

Id.at 18.

422

Id.

17-18.

"[L]and, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be
maintained." Id.
424 Id.at 19.
423

425 MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 347.
426

Id.

427

Id.

428 However, of course, anecdotal evidence does not always support the conclusion
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Judge Fukushima ultimately found the SDF unconstitutional, 429
which contradicted the LDP's express interpretation as well as
Supreme Court precedent that defensive force was consistent with
Impeachment proceedings were initiated and
Article 9.430
Fukushima's career suffered; eventually he quit.43 1 However, note
that this anecdote is not totally convincing. Judges have an
obligation to uphold the law, and they are bound by the
constitutional law as well as the highest court's interpretation of
the law. If a judge fails to apply a test or an interpretation of the
Supreme Court in his analysis, then he is not upholding the law.
Upholding the law requires that judges apply the law as written or
interpreted by the highest courts, or else the law is nothing but the
Accordingly, impeachment
whim of any particular judge.
were probably appropriate
demotions
and
career
proceedings
courses of action, notwithstanding the Rasmeyer hypothesis.
Nevertheless, the authors ran a series of more rigorous
empirical investigations to answer their question. They used
multivariate regression techniques which controlled a number of
confounding factors 432 to predict judicial career success."' Their
results consistently suggested the background presence of politics
in the judicial arena. First, judges who issued anti-government
opinions 434 received less desirable jobs when it came time for
triannual transfer,435 suggesting that a discrete but influential
political incentive system exists. 436 The incentives include salary
of an empirical or statistical investigation.
429 MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 347, at 19.
430 Id.at 20.
431 Id.

432 This list includes: flunked entrance exam, gender, university attended,
opinions/year, prestige of the first job assignment, the prestige of a judge's job
assignments during the 1980s, the location of a judge's initial assignment, a judge's
location during the 1980s, if a judge was a member of the Young Jurists League, the
number of anti-government decisions that a judge issued from 1965-1974, the number of
anti-government decisions that a judge issued from 1975-1984, whether a judge issued
any anti-government decisions during 1965-1974, and whether a judge issued any antigovernment decisions from 1975-1984. Id. at 51-52.
433 Id. at 49-51 (discussing how the authors tested their research hypothesis).
434 I.e., those that did not favor the government as a party, but the opposing party.
435 MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 347, at 57.
436 Id. at 60.
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rate, geographical location, and prestige associated with the
assigned judicial position.4 37

On the whole, Japanese Supreme Court Justices have been
438
deferential to the Diet, refusing to find laws unconstitutional.
The authors posit that this may be the case because nearly all
justices were recent LDP appointees. 4' 9 The LDP may favor these
appointees because they have led long careers as jurists deciding
cases consistently with LDP ideologies, and because the older age
of these appointees assures little to no ideological fluctuation. It is
the Rasmeyer theory that judges who ventured outside of the
LDP's ideological grasp by finding the national apportionment
scheme improper were disciplined by the Secretariat through pay
decreases, changes in location, or demotion."
As evidenced,
deciding constitutional or other significant issues against the
government generally brings about some form of demotion for the
deciding judge because of the political incentive system that is in
place.
Alternatively, Japanese judges may believe that politics are
outside of the judicial arena and refuse to become involved in
cases that are politically charged, except for affirming the
government's position." In cases which depend on the creation
of new law, rather than mere interpretation, these judges may
refuse to take what amounts to a political view on the subject by
deciding it." 2 However, when cases are not as important, at least
for the government, judges are allowed more leeway in their
decisions, without having to worry about their placement." 3 As
437 Id.

438 Id. at 63. Although this may just be a residual effect of the political question
doctrine and/or the imperial Japanese judicial system, in which it was not the role of the
judiciary to answer constitutional questions.
439 Id.

440 Id. at 70. Factors controlled for included: good jobs the decade before the
opinion; bad jobs the decade before the opinion, the number of years between the
opinion and the year a judge graduated from the LRTI; the estimated number of years
between college graduation and entrance to the LRTI, graduation from an elite
university; number of opinions/year; initially hired to the Toyko District Court; and
member of the Young Jurists League in 1969.
441 The JudicialSystem, supra note 326.
442 Id.
443 MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 347, at 79.
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stated by political scientist T.J. Pempel, the Supreme Court "has
been an important, if frequently unrecognized, vehicle for
preserving the status quo in Japan and for reducing the capacity of
the courts to reverse executive actions." 4 "
Thus, when the government is a party to the suit, it is not
surprising that courts generally find in its favor. 445 The Rasmeyer
Hypothesis posits that the government, through the power of the
Supreme Court Secretariat, rewards judges who are progovernment and punishes those who decide against the
government. 446 So too, in tax cases, in which the government is
party to the suit, it wins nearly all of the time. 447 However, tax
cases are not as important as cases that involve constitutional or
political questions. According to the Rasmeyer Hypothesis, when
deciding tax cases, the courts tend to reward accuracy more than
government favoritism.448
The judicial system has a unique interrelationship with the
Japanese criminal system. Conviction rates in Japan are very
high. 449 This fact alone makes the Japanese criminal system
extremely predictable, which could perhaps deter more crime
because potential criminals are virtually insured negative
consequences of illegal acts. 45° Based on the authors' empirical
to convict, based
testing, there are biased incentives for judges
451
accuracy.
legal
and
both on political reliability

444 The JudicialSystem, supra note 326.
445 MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 347, at 82.
446 Id. at 83.
447 Id. at 94.

The control variables in this analysis included: percentage of time
spent in prestigious appointments the decade before the opinion; percentage of time
spent in branch office positions the decade before the opinion; the number of years
between the opinion and the year a judge graduated from the LRTI; the number of years
between college graduation and entrance to the LRTI; graduation from an elite college
(Tokyo or Kyoto); opinions per year, whether initially hired at the Toyko District Court;
and membership in the Young Jurists League in 1969. Id. at 89.
448 Id. at 95. The authors contend that the Secretariat promotes accuracy in tax
cases because it may translate into accuracy in all other types of cases that come before
the courts.
449 MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 347, at 97. Japanese Courts
convict 99.9% of all defendants. Id.
450 See id. at 100.
451 See id. at 121.
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Interpretationsand Limitations of the Rasmeyer
Hypothesis

The Ramseyer Hypothesis concludes that the LDP influences
the judiciary in ways that the public does not notice through
control of transfers or reassignments.4 2 Through their empirical
investigation, the authors suggest that LDP control differs as based
on what type of case that comes before the court. This type of
analysis has several limitations. First, to take certain types of
cases in isolation is erroneous because a wide and diverse range of
cases come before district court judges.453 Supreme Court
Secretariat decisions to transfer or reassign judges are made on the
basis of all of these cases, not merely those of a certain type. A
more useful analysis would transfer from a group of variables
including type of case and case outcome. This, however, was not
the analysis performed.
Secondly, the authors set controls for many variables that were
potentially collinear.454 Use of multivariate models with collinear

explanatory variables can be a fatal flaw because it will produce
inaccurate estimates of the true effect on the outcome of the
independent variable of interest. For example, the authors
controlled for both the number of anti-government decisions that a
judge issued from 1965-1974 and whether that judge had any antigovernment decisions from 1965 to 1974. 455 This is problematic
because both variables measure the same thing, but in a slightly
different form. Therefore, model construction was faulty and
could have led to unreliable and invalid results.
The substantial limitations of the Ramseyer research mean that
more research is necessary to determine whether the LDP
indirectly has a substantive effect on the judiciary. In the absence
of empirical evidence of actual substantive control of the judiciary,

452 MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 347, at 170.
453 See John 0. Haley, The Japanese Judiciary: Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy,

and the Public Trust, http://law.wustl.edu/iglslecturepapers/2003-3HaleyJapanese
Judiciary.html (stating that district court judges decide "over 1100 civil, administrative,
and criminal cases per judge per year").
454 "Collinear" variables are those which are highly correlated with each other to
such an extent that they are nearly indistinguishable from each other. MEASURING
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 347, at 170.
455 Id. at 52.
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it can be assumed that LDP control is only procedural in nature,
(i.e., it pertains only to transfers and re-assignments). The authors
contend, on the other hand, that LDP procedural control has
become substantive over time.456 With both anecdotal and
empirical evidence of career incentives for members of the
Japanese judiciary, the question is why does the Japanese judiciary
not have the ability to rid itself of the political influences of the
LDP? 457 Rasmeyer contends that the reason might have to do with
a Prisoner's Dilemma principle.458
In a Prisoner's Dilemma, rational players who expect to play
the game only once will not refrain from taking advantage of each
other in their choices.
If, however, they think their own
cooperation will induce the other side to cooperate with them later,
players who expect to play the game with each other indefinitely
do have an incentive to cooperate.459
The LDP has remained in power in Japan for a long time.46 °
Therefore, the judiciary knows then that the majority of
constituents have beliefs consistent with the LDP because voters
keep re-electing LDP officials and that the LDP ideology is going
to shape the law.46 1 On the other hand, the incentive to cooperate
with the other branches of the U.S. government may not be as
strong, because of the constant flip-flop of the dominant political
party.
This suggestion possesses very little merit, because it assumes
that the LDP has enough weight to affect such decisions from the
judiciary. First, the LDP does not command nearly as much
respect as the judiciary.462 Second, the high number of factions
within the LDP makes complete consensus on any given issue,
even within the party, extremely difficult. 463 Thus, there must be
some other explanation. Japanese courts could remain entirely
impartial and unbiased in their decision-making despite some
456

Id.

457 See id. at 123.
458 See id.
459 Id.
460

See

MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE,

supra note 347, at 123-24.

461 Id.
462

Haley, supra note 23, at 29.

463 See The Liberal Democratic Party, http://countrystudies.us/japan/I22.htm.
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influence by the LDP and other political leaders. Alternatively,
Japanese courts are internally biased and lack independence
because of internal influence and politics, which would also be
unnoticeable to the average observer. Certainly, it is possible that
both explanations are valid in one respect or another. If there is a
complete lack of judicial independence, it is not observable by the
everyday observer, which may be the reason that the judiciary
itself has begun investigating whether it needs some type of selfregulatory code. 464 On the other hand, the Japanese courts may be

completely capable of operating without bias, in a sufficiently
independent way, and with utmost impartiality even in light of
some interconnection with the political branch of government.
The Rasmeyer empirical study is not definitive because of its
flaws and, as such, it cannot be concluded that the Ramseyer
hypothesis is correct. Accordingly, if LDP control of the judiciary
is merely procedural in nature, then this could explain why public
support of the Japanese judiciary remains strong in light of some
form of indirect control of the judiciary by the LDP. In a system
regulated by external procedures, the public is likely to have great
faith.
J. The Possibilityof Public Confidence in the Japanese
System
The Japanese evidence a judicial system with high public
confidence465 and less than total judicial independence.466 Recent
commentators have advanced the idea that the LDP has implicitly
influenced the judiciary and, in this way, reduced judicial
independence.467 If this is indeed the case, at least to some extent,
then how can the public maintain confidence in the judiciary?
Whatever the case, whether there is substantive or procedural
influence of the judiciary by the LDP, the Japanese judicial system
is predictable. In a number of types of cases, the average Japanese
citizen most likely will know the outcome of a given case before a
decision is handed down, because the Japanese courts are pro-

464 MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 347, at 17.

465 Haley, supra note 23, at 29.
466 MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 347, at 170.
467 Id.
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government in deciding cases.4 68 Yet, the average Japanese citizen
displays a great amount of faith in the judicial system, in fact,
more faith than in other Japanese institutions central to the needs
of a functioning society.4 69 This begs the question of what amount
of public support is necessary for the judicial system to function
and for public confidence in the judiciary to translate into an
effective judicial system?47 ° Perhaps a majority is necessary, or a
supermajority, or it may be that people are indifferent to the
judicial and legal systems as a whole, yet may maintain utmost
faith in it.471 More importantly, how can public confidence in the
judiciary remain so strong when judges are less than completely
independent?
It is possible, indeed even likely, that the Rasmeyer
Hypothesis is incorrect inasmuch as the analysis exaggerated the
relationship472 between judicial demotion and anti-LDP or antigovernment decisions. Although Rasmeyer's thesis brings to light
a complex and potentially politically influenced judicial system,
Rasmeyer failed to acknowledge that the LDP itself is
ideologically and politically complex, thus failing to adhere
strictly to one philosophy.473 This is the case because the LDP is
composed of factions which engage in divisive struggles despite
overall LDP cohesion.47 4 Accordingly, during elections,
the LDP
475
runs not only against other parties, but also itself.
It could be possible that the judiciary retains the public's
confidence despite implicit political control by the LDP because of
the public's respect for the LDP. This, however, is unlikely.
468 Id. at 17 (arguing that the LDP exerts indirect influences on Japanese judgments
by controlling placement for biannual or triannual job transfers). However, the
predictability in some of the cases might arise because courts have continued to apply the
political question doctrine. See HENDERSON, supra note 372, at 124.

469 Haley, supra note 23, at 29.
470 See Cepl, supra note 409, at 5.
471 See id.

472 I.e., in his modeling technique, he used many variables that appeared to be
closely related and therefore collinear which may produce a biased result. Kleinbaum,
Kupper, Muller, Nizam, APPLIED REGRESSION ANALYSIS AND OTHER MULTIVARIABLE
METHODS 191 (3d ed., 1998).
473 See Liberal Democratic Party,supra note 463.
474 See id.
475 See id.
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Judicial officials enjoy a higher status and are more respected than
their political counterparts.4 76

Because of the accountability of

politicians, the public could vote out LDP officials who seek to
influence the judiciary through the assignment system.4 77
Finally, the answer may lie in the fact that when LDP
influence occurs, it is procedural; it pertains to court transfers and
assignments.
Whether these transfers and assignments are
prompted by substantive interpretations of the law is debatable at
best. After all, the LDP has an interest in keeping the judiciary
impartial and independent, as well as maintaining the public's
confidence in the judiciary. Moreover, the members of the LDP
are elected by the people; therefore, through the exertion of
procedural controls over the judiciary, the LDP can sufficiently
account for its constituents' desires to keep the judiciary fair and
impartial.

VII.Public Confidence Without Complete Independence
A. The Ideal Amount of JudicialIndependence: A
ComparativeApproach
The two judicial systems, the American and Japanese, are
distinct institutions with common goals. Each system desires to
have a fair and impartial judiciary that is sufficiently independent,
with the effect of promoting public confidence in the judicial
system and maximizing justice. 47 8 To shed some light on each
system, I have examined the history of the systems, because
without looking to the respective pasts of each nation, we cannot
begin to understand the functioning of our judicial systems today.
The Japanese judicial system has maintained less than
complete judicial independence, during both imperial and modem
times.479

Constitutional

clauses

in

the

modem

Japanese

Constitution requiring "judicial independence" have not improved
the system.48° In imperial Japan, the emperor frequently bribed
476 See Haley, supra note 23, at 29.
477 Id. at 22.
478 ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2004); THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN,

Ch. IV.
479 Ramseyer, supra note 308, at 725, 734.
480 THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN, Ch. IV, art. 76(3).
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judges, which resulted in the corruption of the entire judicial
system.8 l On the other hand, in modern Japan, the LDP has the
potential to seriously influence the decisions of judges through
both substantive and/or procedural means.482
It is unclear whether or not judges are actually transferred for
failing to decide cases in a pro-government fashion. Rasmeyer
does develop a thesis that the LDP monitors every judicial
decision and rewards or punishes them accordingly through job
assignments, a transaction that would go largely unnoticed by the
average Japanese citizen.483 However, empirical evidence is less
than perfect, both in terms of availability and statistically, and
other theories may explain Rasmeyer's observations. Judges may
simply internalize LDP ideology to such an extent that the
overwhelming majority of their decisions favor the LDP.4" On
the other hand, for example, the senior judges may exert their
politics on the junior judges through job assignments.481 If one of
these alternate explanations is the case, then LDP influence is
solely procedural in nature.
Whatever the case, the deficiency of judicial independence has
not been detrimental for Japan. Citizens retain great faith and
respect for the judiciary regardless.486 This suggests one of three
possibilities: (1) Japanese citizens do not know that their judiciary
is operating under the implicit influence of the LDP; (2) lack of
judicial independence does not perfectly correlate with a lack of
public confidence in the judiciary; or (3) LDP control of the
Japanese judiciary is procedural in nature and exerts influence
over an otherwise uncontrolled judicial system, which the public
appreciates. While it is possible that the LDP may in some largely
unobservable ways exert influence on the judiciary,487 citizens are
able to observe everyday court transactions and note that courts
routinely rule in favor of the government and consistently with the
LDP. Thus, the manifest decision-making of the court influences
481

Id. at 734. The emperor worked by proxy through oligarchs.

482

See id. at 725.

483

See

484

See id. at 9.

485

See Haley, supra note 23, at 6.

486

See id. at 29.

487

See

MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE,

MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE,

supra note 347, at 17.

supra note 347, at 170.
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the public's perception of it, and the public is usually able to
determine whether conduct is appropriate or inappropriate.
Decisions may appear pro-government because judges refuse
to get involved in political or quasi-political questions.488
Decisions may favor the government, because under the standard
489
of review selected, the government indeed comes out on top.
Failure to apply the political question doctrine where it is
applicable may have the opposite effect-making the public
perceive its judicial body in a poor light, especially when the
political question doctrine has been used traditionally. Thus,
negative reassignments may be made where the judge oversteps
his bounds by improperly ruling on a political question, and this,
in turn, may increase public confidence in the judiciary because it
is perceived to be the appropriate disciplinary measure.4 90
Accordingly, a slight amount of LDP procedural influence
may have a positive effect on the Japanese judiciary. For
example, it might prevent the judiciary from running solely on
inner-court politics, a characteristic of any organization that is
given the power to regulate itself.49' However, the Japanese
judiciary refuses, by its own will, to provide its judges with a set
of regulations to guide their conduct. Instead they choose to
regulate and monitor their behavior implicitly through, for
example, mentorship.492
In theory, the judiciary can make its own explicit regulations
to guide judicial behavior, laying out what is permitted and what is
prohibited in such a manner as to override any such implicit
monitoring that occurs on the part of the LDP. The Supreme
Court is vested with this power in Article 77 of the Constitution.493
Therefore, it can delineate the guidelines for bi- or tri-annual
reviews, and how period assignments should be made, taking into

488

See HENDERSON, supra note 379, at 124.

See id. at 143 (recognizing that in Japan, the judiciary is "subordinate" to the
legislative body).
490 See Haley, supra note 23, at 5.
489

491 Both by Constitution, see THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN, Ch. IV, art. 76(3), and
also implicitly because senior judges are assigned to positions where they work with
junior judges.
492 Haley, supra note 23, at 6.
493

See THE CONSTITUTION

OF JAPAN,

Ch. IV, art. 77.
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Establishing a guide for
account a number of factors.4 94
appropriate conduct would also spell out impartial and
independent methods more fully, so that judges would have no
doubt whether their behavior is appropriate. In turn, creation of a
set of regulations would have the net effect of increasing public
confidence in the judiciary and would give substance to the basis
for how transfers and reassignments are to occur.
Japan is interested in creating its own Code for Judicial
Conduct structured similar to the American model. 495 This
suggests that Japanese judges need a code to guide their conduct.
Japanese judges may need a code for one primary reason: the
current system may not promote the ultimate objectives of
independence and impartiality in the absence of appropriate
safeguards. The Japanese judiciary itself may be run by internal
politics because there is no better guide for ethical conduct. For
example, junior judges may be substantially influenced by the
ideas and methodologies of senior judges in their court. Senior
judges may simply reinforce the tradition of deciding cases in a
manner that reinforces the status quo, thereby operating in a
manner inconsistent with independence from other, albeit
judicially related, sources.
Such undue influence of the Japanese courts, if not offered
from external sources, most likely comes from sources internal to
the courts or from some combination of internal and external
pressure. This lack of independence49 6 is undesirable in any court
system because it means that judges are not deciding cases based
on their own fair and neutral application of the law, but according
to their understanding of how others would apply the law in the
situation.497 Ultimately, if the lack of judicial independence
becomes noticeably visible or rises to a certain level, this reduces
the public's confidence in the judiciary.498
494 See generally Haley, supra note 23 (stressing that the Japanese judiciary can
theoretically make its own regulations and that it does, especially in regard to court
assignments).
495 See Interview with Judge James Wynn, Judge, North Carolina Court of Appeals
(June 13, 2004).
496 Not taken here to mean separation of powers, but rather something akin to
impartiality.
497 Gass, supra note 1, at 8-9.
498 See id. at 9.
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On the other hand, independence in the traditional sense 4 99 has
not been harmful to Japan, because it seems only to include
procedural influences. However, this lack of independence could
become harmful if new political regimes become dominant and
suddenly change procedures. Such a change may have a direct
effect on public confidence.
Moreover, if the lack of
independence relied on substantive grounds, a change in political
regimes may significantly change the substantive law, if courts
become influenced to decide cases more or less conservatively.
This sudden change, occurring simultaneously with a change in
political leadership, could be devastating to the Japanese judiciary
because the public would recognize that partisan behavior is
inextricably linked to the process of judicial decision-making.
It is completely possible, though rarely acknowledged, that the
objectives of the judicial system may be realized in a system that
is not completely independent. The interesting thing about this is
that a decrease in the other two goals for the judiciary will not
achieve the same sort of effect. In fact, more public confidence in
the judiciary may be fostered if another body can control the
procedures that govern the court. If so, citizens can view the
courts as powerful in their own domain, though if courts overstep
their bounds, a check on their power exists.
While the complete lack of procedural and substantive judicial
independence is undesirable, American courts demonstrate that
extreme judicial independence is also undesirable. 00 A judiciary
that operates completely within itself, without any outside checks
and balances applied by another branch of government, may be so
independent that it will discount the public's confidence. For
example, in some states, the state Supreme Court has the exclusive
power to create and modify Codes of Judicial Conduct and also
interpret cases that arise from potential violations of these
Codes."' This dual responsibility of some states is a violation of
separation of powers and also reduces the public's confidence in
the judiciary because it appears that there is no check on the
499 Taken to mean separation of powers.
500 Justice at Stake, supra note 21, at 5 (showing that the public confidence in the
judiciary is not as high as it could be). This is especially important to note since there
have been substantial modifications to judicial codes across time.
501 For example, North Carolina, which modifies and interprets its Code in isolation.
Gass, supra note 1, at 2.
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judicial power.
Even though the American system appears to be devoid of the
influences of other branches of government and is a system that is
entirely and unnecessarily independent, it is noteworthy in one
respect.
Unlike Japan, which has a career judiciary, some
American judges might begin their careers in politics and, often
after a successful or unsuccessful run as a state judge, return to
political positions. Therefore, because judges are often members
of other political branches throughout their careers, it is especially
important to regulate judicial conduct and reinforce the obligations
and responsibilities to which the judicial branch must subscribe,
without any sort of political influence whatsoever.
Yet, other branches of government, specifically the
legislatures, have been unwilling to impose greater regulation on
the judiciary, despite the fact that the Constitution does not
prescribe such regulation. °3
Presumably, this has occurred
because the separate branches of government believe that if they
exert too much unwanted control over another branch of
government, the other branch will retaliate in kind. 5°4 There are
several ways that the legislature can comply with separation of
powers and remain benevolent towards the judicial branch of
government, simultaneously increasing the effectiveness of the
judiciary by increasing the public's confidence in it. There is a
large distinction between allowing judges to act in a manner
similar to politicians and allowing another branch of government
to keep a procedural "check" on the judicial branch.
For example, in "checking" the judiciary, a state legislature
could adopt the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, a Code created
with input from experts who are not associated with the judicial
branch in any manner. On the other hand, the legislature could
specify that the state Supreme Court is delegated the responsibility
of creating a Code of Judicial Conduct but that it must create or
revise the Code only with input from outsiders on a panel.0 5
502 Theoretically, there is a point where the courts can become so independent that
they violate separation of powers and escape from a system of checks and balances.
503 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. Art I.
504 For example, if the legislature regulates judicial conduct or the judicial process
through legislation, the judiciary may respond by finding pieces of legislation that come
before it unconstitutional.
505 E.g., Arizona. See Arizona Judicial Conduct and Ethics (1993), THE BULLETIN,
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Involvement of other members of the legal community, especially
academics, preserves the appearance that the rules are being
created on the basis of appropriate considerations rather than
merely on a whim.5 °6 Additional involvement by ordinary citizens
will give the public an understanding that the Code was created
fairly and will ultimately make it aware of the rules that are
supposed to guide judicial conduct." 7
Another legislative strategy that may bring additional repute to
the American judiciary is the specification of qualifications that a
judicial candidate must possess to be a judge. Today, anyone who
possesses a legal degree can be a judge. In Japan, on the other
hand, there is a very difficult examination that lawyers must pass
if they wish to be a judge, and inter-court judicial transfer 0 8 is
highly controlled by the Supreme Court Secretariat. On the other
hand, the United States process of judicial elections has no
mechanism that affords any weight to any qualifications that a
judicial candidate must possess in running for a seat on the
bench." 9 For example, there is no minimum age requirement for
being a judge, and no rules requiring that judicial candidates
practice for a certain number of years in a particular area of law if
they wish to become a family or bankruptcy court judge.510
Specification of qualifications that judges must possess would be
extremely helpful. It would have the effect of reducing the
number of candidates vying for a particular position and, it would
ensure that the judge who wins the seat would possess the skills
that that seat requires. Furthermore, it would increase the public's
confidence that the newly elected or appointed judge has the
requisite skills for the job.
North Carolina has elected not to implement any of these
No. 4 at 1, http://www.supreme.state.az.us/ethics/bulletin/BulletinNumber_4.pdf
(Arizona makes changes to its judicial code with the help of a judicial conduct
commission); The Massachusetts Court System, Rules Applicable to the Committee,
http://www.mass.gov/courts/courtsandjudges/courts/supremejudicialcourt/cje/rules.htmrl
(reporting the rules created by the legislature that the judicial committee must abide by).
506 Gass, supra note 1, at 20.
507

Most citizens are ignorant of the rules that their states' judges must abide by.

508

For example, whether a judge is transferred to a family court.

509 See Interview with Judge James Wynn, North Carolina Court of Appeals (June
13, 2004).
510 See N.C. CONST. arts. II and IV (2005).
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strategies. 511 The North Carolina legislature completely delegated
its power to the judiciary by statute, allowing the North Carolina
Supreme Court to create a Code of Judicial Conduct that most
judges in the state5 12 must abide by.513 Such total delegation of the
legislature's rule-making power to the Supreme Court may have
the effect of eroding the public's confidence in the judiciary,
especially when the North Carolina Supreme Court interprets its
Code inconsistently with the language that the Code itself
promulgates. 14 However, the legislature can easily solve this
problem, by setting forth what considerations are necessary for the
Supreme Court to create or modify the Code, or what procedures
must be followed in order to create the Code. In this way, the
legislature would not intrude upon the substance of any
regulations for judicial conduct. This merely alters the procedure
in a manner that would be more favorable to a positive perception
of the North Carolina judiciary.
There is nothing in the
Constitution which precludes legislatures from exercising some
sort of procedural control as a check on judicial power.
The main problem with the current scheme in North Carolina,
as well as other states, is that the North Carolina Supreme Court,
behind closed doors and without external input, revised its Code
and created very lenient and liberal standards for ethical judicial
conduct. 515 Although a more lenient Code is beneficial for judges
in that it allows judges to lead lives akin to any other citizen, it5 1is6
detrimental to the public that will come before these judges.
Judges in their activities may appear, or actually be, partial in one
manner or another but still remain able to hear cases that may pose
a conflict for judges. Moreover, in revising the Code on the
assumption that clauses were unconstitutionally vague, the North
Carolina Supreme Court rewrote the Code to make certain
511 See id.

512 Administrative judges are excluded. The legislature specifies by statute that
North Carolina administrative judges must abide by the Model Code of Judicial Conduct.
513 See N.C. GEN. STAT., § 7A-10.1 (2003).

514 See, e.g., Lange v. Lange, 357 N.C. 645 (2003) (espousing that actual bias is
required to disqualify a judge from sitting on a particular case rather than the mere
suggestion of bias, even though the code retains "reasonable" language which indicates
that the appearance of impropriety would require disqualification).
515 See Gass, supra note 1, at 2.
516 See id. at 18.
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previously prohibited conduct permissible. 5 17 However, in so
doing, the drafters created new, more vague, clauses, providing
little to no notice about what appropriate conduct actually is.
Alternatively, if a nation doesn't want to compromise
complete judicial independence in any respect, even procedurally,
then there is another option. The judiciary can choose to put into
use an extremely restrictive Code regulating judicial behavior, like
the Bangalore Principles, which retain language prohibiting the
"appearance of impropriety" throughout.518 By selecting the most
restrictive Code, a state demonstrates to the public that it is
important for judges to remain impartial and independent,
therefore increasing public confidence accordingly.
B. Conclusion: How Much JudicialIndependence is
Desirable?:A Lesson from Japan and the U.S.
The Japanese and the American judicial systems have been
compared with respect to judicial independence and the resultant
public confidence in the judiciary. Consequently, complete
judicial independence in the American system is undesirable
because it seems that the public can and does lose confidence in a
system that is either totally self-regulating or a system that creates
the least restrictive rules for itself. The potential for corruption
and misbehavior in a system such as this is too great.
Similarly, a complete lack of judicial independence is also
undesirable. In theory, such a closely controlled system would be
unduly influenced by improper means, making judges both
actually and apparently partial participants in the justice system.
Despite the various theses advanced on how well the Japanese
judicial system works, it seems likely that the Japanese system
operates somewhere between the two extremes on the judicial
independence spectrum. The Japanese courts are controlled by
procedures designated and implemented through the Supreme
Court Secretariat, including judicial assignments and the
establishment of minimal qualifications necessary to be a judge.519
517 See, e.g., North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5(B)(4) (2003)
(allowing direct solicitation when it was previously banned).
518 See generally BANGALORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 18 (espousing throughout that
the appearance of impropriety should be discouraged).
519 MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 347, at 9.
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Ultimately, political influences themselves probably exert
minimum control over judges as they decide cases or evoke the
political question doctrine.2
If this were not the case, there would be no way for the LDP
to exert such great influence over the courts while remaining
unnoticeable. For if the LDP urged the courts to interpret
legislation as constitutional, then the public would easily pick up
on this. Moreover, if transfers to undesirable courts occurred as a
result of anti-government decisions,521 the public would be able to
perceive this as well.
Lower courts and geographically
undesirable courts would be stacked with judges who did not favor
the government.
This simply isn't the case. The Japanese judicial system works
because judges are transferred so frequently and because judges
rotate through nearly every type of court.522 This type of system
allows young judges to work with senior judges with much
experience, and thus use the senior judges as guides for
appropriate judicial conduct.52 3 In fact, this is one of the reasons
that the Japanese judiciary has been able to operate without a
judicial Code for ethical behavior for so long.
On the other hand, judges in the United States require a Code
of Judicial Conduct because young judges do not often work with
senior judges. It is often the case that American judicial
candidates first decide to run for judicial seats toward the end of
their careers. Moreover, judicial candidates rarely confine their
careers to a life's worth of work in the judiciary. Judicial
candidates often begin their careers in politics and enter into the
judicial arena either during the middle or late phases of their
careers.
If legislative influence is too great, however, and exceeds
procedural regulation, then the public may lose confidence in the
judiciary. If the legislative power impairs substantive functioning,
then the public should be able to easily perceive that the judiciary
520 HENDERSON,

supra note 379, at 124.

521 MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 347, at 94 (arguing that judges
are inherently pro-government and that judges may be transferred to less desirable courts
for finding against the government).
522 Haley, supra note 23, at 5.
523

Id.
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is being influenced and accordingly the public confidence in the
justice system will likely decline. Because any type of substantive
regulation or effect would likely be easily noticed even if
measures are implicit, it seems reasonable to conclude that since
public confidence in the Japanese judiciary remains high, no
substantive regulations have been imposed upon the Japanese
courts.
Thus, a lack of complete judicial independence is tolerable and
even desirable in every judicial system. Judicial independence is
not absolutely required for regulations that are procedural in kind
or effect. In fact, such control or influence over the judiciary may
lead to increased public confidence in the judiciary, ultimately
having a positive effect. Yet, judicial independence with regard to
substantive regulations and effects should be treated as completely
necessary to secure fair and impartial trials for all those who come
before courts. Therefore, public confidence in the American
judicial system may be improved if legislatures set forth
procedural guidelines for the creation and modification of judicial
conduct regulations. Moreover, public confidence in the Japanese
judiciary may be improved if the courts create a Code for
appropriate conduct while maintaining procedural influence from
other branches of government. Any judicial system does not work
in isolation; the greatest public confidence in the judiciary can be
achieved with some interdependence between governmental
branches on procedural regulations.
JESSICA CONSER
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